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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress recently passed the most sweeping revision of the federal 
securities laws since 1933-34.1 The view that the securities litigation 
system was broken, and needed fixing, provided the impetus for this 
legislation. The system's supposed failings included the proposition that 
cases were filed too often, based merely upon the fact that the stock 
price had dropped rather precipitously.2 In addition, it was asserted that 
almost all cases settled, with settlement terms which did not relate to the 
"merits" of the suit, but rather were "formulaic."3 
Proponents of securities legislation reform relied heavily upon 
Professor Janet Cooper Alexander's article, Do The Merits Matter? A 
Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, published in the 
Stanford Law Review (Alexander Study).4 Professor Alexander, after 
studying a group of securities cases involving initial public offerings 
(IPOs) in computer-related businesses, asserted that: 
i) Lawsuits were filed "against every company in the industry 
whose stock declined significantly in the months following its initial 
stock offering";5 
ii) virtually every suit settled;6 and 
iii) most cases settled for almost precisely 25 percent of the damage 
exposure, and where they did not, the deviations could be "accounted for 
by non-merits-related factors."7 
Prior to Congress' sweeping revision of the federal securities laws, 
Professor Alexander's article met with broad interest but mixed 
reactions. Several courts cited it, assuming explicitly or implicitly that 
I. Private Securities Litigation RefonnActofl995, 15 U.S.C.A §§ 77k-78 (West 
Supp. I 996). 
2. 140 CONG. REc. S3695, 3706 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994) (statement of Sen. 
Dodd). 
3. Id. 
4. Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); see also S. REP. No. 104-98, 104th Cong., 
!st Sess. 98 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S1075 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Domenici); 139 CONG. REC. Sl6662-63 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Sen. 
Domenici); 141 CONG. REC. S8895-98 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
D'Amato); H.R. REP. No. 104-50, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I (1995). 
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its data were reliable and its conclusions valid.8 Several law review 
articles have relied upon Professor Alexander's article as proof of the 
existence of meritless claims in the securities litigation area.9 
As discussion of the need for securities litigation reform continued, 
Arthur Levitt, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and a key spokesman on this issue, referred to the substance of 
Professor Alexander's conclusions as an indication of flaws in the 
manner in which securities cases were litigated, supporting the need for 
legislative action. 10 Other commentators have suggested, in scholarly 
articles, 11 specialized publications, 12 and Congressional testimony,13 
8. E.g., Kamen v. Fin. Servs., 939 F.2d 458, 462 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
502 U.S. 974 (1991); Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st 
Cir. 1991); In re Urcarco Sec. Litig., 148 F.R.D. 561, 566 (N.D. Tex. 1993); In re 
VeriFone Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1485 (N.D. Cal. 1992), ajf'd, Halkin v. 
VeriFone Inc., 11 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993); Mirkin v. Wasserman, 5 Cal. 4th 1082, I 107 
(1993). 
9. See. e.g., Anthony Q. Fletcher, Curing Crib Death: Emerging Companies. 
Nuisance Suits, and Congressional Proposals For Securities Litigation Reform, 32 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 493, 503 (I 995); Jill E. Fisch, As Time Goes By: New Questions About The 
Statute Of Limitations For Rule /Ob-5, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. SIOI, S125 (1993); 
Margaret A. Berger, Civil Litigation In The Twenty-First Century: A Panel Discussion, 
59 BROOK. L. REV. 1199, 1215-16 (1993); Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation To 
Private Justice: Legal Practice At War With The Profession And Its Values, 59 BROOK. 
L. REV. 931, 943 (1993); Stephen E. Morrissey, State Settlement Class Actions That 
Release Exclusive Federal Claims: Developing A Framework For Multijurisdictional 
Management Of Shareholder Litigation, 95 COLUMB. L. REV. 1765-6 (1995). 
I 0. Chairman Arthur Levitt, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks 
at Securities Regulation Institute, University of California, San Diego held in Coronado, 
California (Jan. 26, 1994) (transcript available from authors). According to Levitt, 
"some allege that settlements often fail to reflect the underlying merits of the cases. If 
true, this means that weak claims are overcompensated and strong claims are 
undercompensated." Id. 
11. Lester B. Snyder & Jerry G. Gonick, The Interrelationship of Securities Class 
Action Litigation and Pension Plan Tax Policy: What's Really at Stake?, 21 SEC. REG. 
L.J. 123, 126 n.4 (1993); Steven P. Marino & Renee D. Marino, An Empirical Study of 
Recent Securities Class Action Settlements Involving Accountants, Attorneys, or 
Underwriters, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 115, 142 (1994); Adam F. Ingber, /Ob-5 or Not /Ob-5?: 
Are the Current Efforts to Reform Securities Litigation Misguided?, 6 I FORDHAM L. 
REV. S351, S361-62 (1993). 
12. In Camera, 14 CLASS ACTION REP. I, 70 ( I 991 ). 
13. What We Know and Don't Know: A Very Short Primer on Securities Class 
Actions, Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, United States House of Representatives (Aug. I 0, 1994) 
(testimony of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., Columbia University Law School) (available 
from the authors). Labeling as a "myth" Professor Alexander's conclusion that "[t]he 
merits don't matter," Professor Coffee offers his personal judgment "that the merits do 
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that Professor Alexander might be wrong, but none have carefully 
reviewed her data or provided a counterstudy of their own. 
With this backdrop of general acceptance of Professor Alexander's 
work, the 104th Congress addressed the issue of securities litigation 
reform, and enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA or Act). As noted above, in advocating the need for legislation, 
proponents frequently referred to Professor Alexander's conclusions. 14 
Ultimately, this assertion prevailed, as bills passed the House and Senate, 
were reconciled, and despite President Clinton's veto, were enacted into 
law by a two-thirds override vote of each House. 15 
Because of the importance of this matter, we have undertaken a 
careful review of Professor Alexander's statistical analysis. The results 
are startling and suggest that Congress has legislated on the basis of 
false and/or misleading data. Not only is Professor Alexander's study 
fundamentally flawed, but her conclusions are inconsistent with both a 
replication of her study done with the most obvious flaws corrected, and 
a broader, more reliable study. 
In sum, it appears that Congress has legislated on the basis of data 
which was erroneous. Although it remains to be seen what Congress has 
wrought with this Act, it is clear that the Act cannot solve the "problem" 
identified by Professor Alexander, because the "problem" she described 
does not exist. Whatever one's view on securities litigation and the 
recent Act, the history of Professor Alexander's study should be 
carefully scrutinized as it provides a cautionary tale about the use of 
seemingly objective academic studies as a basis for legislation. 16 
IL SUMMARY OF OUR REVIEW OF PROFESSOR ALEXANDER'S STUDY 
As experienced practitioners in the field of securities law, we found 
Professor Alexander's conclusions surprising and contrary to both our 
intuition and our experience. Our view was that strong cases generally 
settle for more than weak ones, other things being equal. Having settled 
dozens of such cases, we could recall that the strength of a case is often 
the first matter discussed in settlement talks and, along with defendants' 
matter-but not enough." Id. at I, 5. 
14. See supra note 5. 
15. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A §§ 77k-78 (West 
Supp. l 996). 
16. Compounding the problems caused by Professor Alexander's Stanford Law 
Review article, she has published two additional articles which utilize the same data, and 
has relied on her prior conclusions in addressing other related topics. See Janet C. 
Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1421, 
1422-23, 1439 ( I 994); Janet C. Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial 
Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 53, 57 (1993). 
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ability to pay, typically drives the discussion. If Professor Alexander 
was right, all of that talk was posturing or self-delusion. 
Moreover, there are examples in the real world of strong cases settling 
for far more than weak cases. Settlements in In re American Continental 
Corp./Lincoln Savings and Loan Securities Litigation11 yielded approxi-
mately $250 million, over 85 percent of total damages of $288 million. 
As one of approximately 100 defendants in that case, Ernst & Young 
alone paid $63 million to settle the case. Did the merits matter in 
Lincoln Savings? It certainly appears so. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, cases where discovery or motion 
practice demonstrate that the merits are questionable often settle for 
small amounts or are dismissed voluntarily. 18 Again, we have sat 
through numerous settlement conferences where defense counsel, 
insurance carriers' counsel, or a settlement judge pointed out the 
infirmities in the case and convinced plaintiffs to settle for a tiny portion 
of the damage exposure. 19 
However, we do not expect the reader to accept our anecdotal 
evidence as against Professor Alexander's purportedly scientific study. 
Rather, we chose to undertake a scientific review of Professor 
Alexander's work. We approached that task in the following fashion: 
17. MDL Docket No. 834 (D. Az.). See generally In re Am. Continental 
Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Ariz. 1992) (detailing 
facts of the underlying cases). 
18. In conjunction with 1993 hearings before the Senate Conunittee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, our firm provided the Committee with information on 18 
cases which were voluntarily dismissed in the four-year period between 1990 and 1993 
and not subsequently refiled. Letter from Melvyn I. Weiss to the Honorable Donald W. 
Riegle, Jr., Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
(Oct. 12, 1993) (on file with authors). Some of those dismissals have been reported in 
the press. See, e.g., Mark V. Boennighausen, Discovering Cooperation, THE RECORDER, 
Mar. 30, 1994, at 1 ("In a second 3Com case filed in 1993, [defense attorney Tower] 
Snow says, he persuaded the plaintiffs to drop the suit by providing them documents 
which showed they didn't have a case."); Lawrence Aragon, Know Thy Enemy, PC 
WEEK, Sept. 13, 1993, at Al ("3Com provided Lerach with all the current analysts' 
reports. . . . Lerach dropped the suit."). 
19. Certainly an extreme example of the merits affecting a settlement is provided 
by the recent case of Assad v. Hibbard Brown & Co. (1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. ,i 98,127, at 98,961 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 1994), which involved a class action 
against a brokerage firm alleging overcharging and market manipulation. In approving 
a minuscule settlement, the court explained that "after extensive discovery, it is 
reasonably clear that the plaintiffs had no valid claims in the first place. If that is so, 
then the proposed settlement would indeed benefit the class members, since they would 
be achieving a (slight) benefit they would not otherwise obtain." Id. 
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First, we closely reviewed her study and found several significant 
methodological errors. By summary: 
I. The sample utilized in Professor Alexander's study is far too 
small and too homogeneous to prove anything conclusive. 
2. Professor Alexander did not apply consistent principles to the 
samples contained in the study, but rather made ad hoc 
adjustments which tend to conform the data to her thesis. 
3. Professor Alexander made several errors in data gathering and 
calculation which further undermine her conclusions. 
Second, we have repeated Professor Alexander's study as she defined 
it (still too small and homogeneous) but without the data errors and 
omissions. The resulting eleven settlements range from a high of nearly 
70 percent to a low of 2 percent, with only five of the settlements falling 
within Professor Alexander's 20-30 percent range. Further, if the 
damage "stakes" are adjusted to account for the general movement of the 
market, the eleven settlements range from a high of nearly 80 percent to 
a low of less than 3 percent, with only three of the settlements falling 
within Professor Alexander's 20-30 percent range. Thus, the corrected 
Alexander Study tells a very different story than the one presented in 
Professor Alexander's article. 
Third, rather than simply critiquing and re-analyzing Professor 
Alexander's work, we have performed our own study in a broader but 
still limited subset of the universe for which Alexander seeks to draw 
conclusions: all securities class actions. The purpose of our study was 
to see if the results of the Alexander Study could be replicated in a 
larger sample. If Professor Alexander's conclusions are valid, they 
should apply not only to her sample-venture capital-backed computer 
companies which went public in early 1983---but also to other industries 
and to other time periods. Our data suggests Professor Alexander's 
results cannot be replicated. 
Finally, we sought to test Professor Alexander's hypotheses by looking 
at data from the economy as a whole. None of the data over the past 
twenty years is consistent with results we would expect to see if 
Professor Alexander's conclusions were correct. 
Because her study contains methodological flaws and her findings 
cannot be replicated in a broader, more representative sample, the 
scientific method strongly suggests that Professor Alexander's conclu-
sions are incorrect. Our conclusion is that the merits do matter in 
settling securities cases, or more incontrovertibly, that Professor 
Alexander's contrary hypothesis is not supported by the objective data. 
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[VOL. 33: 959, 1996] Legislating on a False Foundation 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
III. CRITIQUE OF THE ALEXANDER STUDY'S METHODOLOGY 
A. Summary of the Alexander Study 
Professor Alexander sought to study the settlement of securities cases, 
and particularly whether "strong" cases settled for more (proportional to 
damage exposure) than "weak" cases. As a preliminary inquiry, 
Professor Alexander also proposed to study the extent to which the filing 
of a securities fraud lawsuit is dependent on the amount of damages at 
stake. To resolve these questions, Professor Alexander chose a sample 
of "initial public offerings by computer or computer-related companies 
during the first six months of 1983."20 Of seventeen IPOs which she 
determined met these criteria,21 Alexander found that nine of the 
companies had been subject to a class action lawsuit arising out of the 
offering and that eight of these cases had settled at the time the article 
was written. Thus, to test her principal thesis, Professor Alexander 
analyzed the settlements in only eight securities class action lawsuits.22 
The Alexander Study and its conclusions can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Lawsuits were filed "against every company in the industry 
whose stock declined significantly in the months following its 
initial stock offering";23 
2. virtually every suit settled; 
3. most cases settled for approximately 25 percent of the damage 
exposure; 
20. Alexander, supra note 5, at 506. 
21. In addition, Professor Alexander limited her sample to venture capital-backed 
IPOs, which was apparently based on the source of her information. See infra text 
accompanying note 40. 
22. As noted, suits were filed against nine companies in Professor Alexander's 
sample and eight of those cases had settled at the time Professor Alexander's article was 
written. The ninth case, TeleVideo Systems, settled shortly thereafter. See Cooper v. 
Hwang, No. C-86-20146-WAI (N.D. Cal. 1986) (Tele Video). Inclusion of the Tele Video 
Systems settlement, which was apparently unavailable to Professor Alexander, is one of 
many factors which casts doubt on her conclusions. See infra text accompanying note 
112. 
23. Alexander, supra note 5, at 500. 
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4. in the few cases where settlements deviated from the purported 
"going rate" of 25 percent, the deviations could be "accounted 
for by non-merits-related factors"; 24 and 
5. therefore, since these eight cases were presumed by Professor 
Alexander to vary in strength,25 "[t]he strength of the 
plaintiffs' case on the merits [] [does] not appear to be a 
significant factor in determining the outcome of these cas-
es. "26 
Having drawn these conclusions, Professor Alexander proposed some 
solutions to the "problem" of non-merits-related settlements. Interesting-
ly, these "solutions" are quite different from the provisions of the 
PSLRA. Although we disagree with many of her solutions as a matter 
of policy, because her identification of a problem has generated so much 
interest, in Congress and elsewhere, we will focus our initial attention on 
whether there is any such problem. 
B. Methodological and Theoretical Deficiencies in the 
Alexander Study 
The Alexander Study is marred by several deficiencies in methodolo-
gy. They fall roughly into four categories: 
1. inappropriate sample size, selection, and homogeneity; 
2. inappropriate and/or subjective interpretation and editing of key 
data; 
3. omissions and arithmetic errors; and 
4. improper calculation of damage exposure or "stakes" by failing 
to adjust for movements in the overall market during the 
relevant period. 
Some of these errors impact the data from which Professor Alexander 
draws her conclusions. Others suggest that whatever the data shows, her 
conclusions cannot be extended to securities class actions generally. 
We discuss each of these deficiencies below. 
1. Sample Selection Deficiencies 
Sampling is a statistical technique that is used when the data required 
to prove a hypothesis for an entire population are either too difficult or 
too expensive to obtain.27 Where the researcher seeks to draw inferenc-
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 500, 506, 522-23. 
26. Id. at 500. 
27. See, e.g., GEORGE W. SUMMERS ET AL., BASIC STATISTICS IN BUSINESS AND 
ECONOMICS 11 ( 4th ed. 1985). 
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es about a large population, the objective of sample selection is to 
replicate the characteristics of the entire population which is being 
examined.28 The stated goal of the Alexander Study was to explain the 
incidence of securities class action suits and examine the settlements in 
those suits. Indeed, the title of the article expresses as much: "A Study 
of Settlements in Securities Class Actions." The conclusion reached by 
the Alexander Study is that generally the merits do not matter in 
securities class actions.29 Therefore, the population which the Alexan-
der Study sought to examine was all securities class action suits. 
Assuming that comprehensive data for such a population would be 
difficult and expensive to obtain, sampling would be an appropriate 
means of estimating the population's characteristics. Random selection 
of a significant number of examples from the entire population is the 
preferred technique for selecting a sample.30 A "convenience" or 
"judgment" sample-one selected because it can easily be obtained by the 
researcher-is considered the least representative and least scientific 
sampling technique.31 "Convenience sampling is not widely used in 
circumstances other than preliminary or exploratory studies, or where 
representativeness is not a crucial factor."32 
Professor Alexander chose to look at suits arising (a) from computer 
and computer-related company IPOs, (b) in the first half of 1983, (c) 
which had received venture capital financing. This is clearly a 
convenience sample. Professor Alexander, a Northern California law 
professor, chose to include in her sample only a particular species of 
Northern California securities suit with which she was likely familiar: 
struggling computer-related IPOs listed in the April 1984 Venture 
Capital Survey. The dates chosen narrow the field even further. Indeed, 
Professor Alexander recognizes that 1983 brought a spate of ill-fated 
Silicon Valley IPOs generating similar suits with many similar issues.33 
28. See, e.g., LYMAN Orr & DAVID K. HILDEBRAND, STATISTICAL THINKING FOR 
MANAGERS 177-78 {1983). 
29. Alexander, supra note 5, at 499-500. 
30. See OTT & HILDEBRAND, supra note 29, at 177. 
31. DONALD L. HARNETT & JAMES L. MURPHY, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS FOR 
BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 320 ( 1985). 
32. Id.; see also RICHARD I. LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR MANAGEMENT 275 (4th ed. 
I 987) ("But if a study uses judgment sampling and loses a significant degree of 
'representativeness,' it will have purchased convenience at too high a price."). 
33. Alexander, supra note 5, at 507-09. 
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It is extraordinarily unlikely that such a convenience sample would be 
representative of all securities class actions in the early 1980 s, let alone 
all such actions over all time. Indeed, Professor Alexander's sample 
selection can be critiqued on three independent bases. 
a. Size of Sample 
In 1983 there were approximately 10,000 publicly traded companies 
in the United States.34 Slightly more than 1,500 of those companies 
made common stock offerings in that year.J5 Six hundred eighty-six 
of those offerings were IPOs.36 Between July 1983 and June 1984, 
there were a total of 149 securities class action lawsuits filed.J7 
Against this large population, Professor Alexander studied a total of 
seventeen IPOs and nine resulting class action suits, eight of which 
settled. Intuitively, the sample seems far too small to support any 
conclusions drawn regarding the incidence of suits or the amounts of the 
settlements which resulted, and statistical principles confirm this intuitive 
reaction_Js 
34. S.E.C., DIRECTORY OF COMPANIES REQUIRED TO FILE ANNUAL REPORTS WITH 
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 
OF I 934 I (July 31, I 984). 
35. Search of Effective New Issues (Public) Database, IDD Information Services, 
Securities Data Company, New York, N.Y. 
36. Id. 
37. 1984 DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 448. Even these figures 
grossly understate the size of the relevant population which Professor Alexander is 
attempting to measure. Because Professor Alexander is seeking to draw inferences about 
settlements generally across time (and not just in 1983), the population actually consists 
of suits filed during a multi-year period. For instance, focusing on the ten-year period 
between I 984 and 1993, the Administrative Office statistics show a total of 1,921 
securities class action lawsuits filed in federal courts. See i11fra tbl. 7. 
38. The inadequacy of the sample size can be demonstrated mathematically by 
comparing the variation in Professor Alexander's sample of 8 cases with the variation 
in our expanded sample of 18 cases. See iltfra tbl. 4-B I. Using the corrected data ftom 
Table 4-B I, the sample standard deviation for Professor Alexander's 8 cases is a 
relatively narrow 7.30%. The standard deviation for the expanded set of 18 cases (which 
includes all of Professor Alexander's eight cases) is a much wider 18.52%. 
Neither of the samples is a truly random selection ftom the universe of securities class 
actions. Yet, as we later explain, the homogeneity of Professor Alexander's selection 
technique would tend to minimize the amount of sample variability, making it even less 
likely that her small sample of 8 cases even remotely represents the characteristics of the 
population she has attempted to measure. 
There is a small probability-between 0.5 and I %-that a random sample of 8 ftom a 
population with a true standard deviation of I 8.52% would generate a sample standard 
deviation of 7.30%. This can be demonstrated by a formula in which a ratio of the 
sample variance (s2) multiplied by the appropriate degrees offteedom divided by the true 
variance is compared with a table showing percentage points of the Chi-square 
distribution. (Note that the variance is the square of the standard deviation and the 
degrees of freedom is one less than the sample size.) Calculating the ratio 
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Moreover, it is unclear why Professor Alexander found it necessary to 
impose certain limitations on her study which had the effect of 
drastically reducing its size. For instance, Professor Alexander notes that 
her sample included only venture capital-backed IPOs, apparently 
because her source, the Venture Capital Survey, was limited to this type 
of offering. 39 Other than convenience, she never offers any substantive 
explanation for this limitation. From other readily available sources we 
were able to compile a list of forty-two computer and computer-related 
IPOs during the first half of 1983 which met all of Professor 
Alexander's other criteria.40 
It is similarly unclear why computer-related companies should be 
studied separately. Even accepting Professor Alexander's asserted need 
for similarity, her description of the unique business environment of 
early 1983 applies generally to high-technology companies.41 Using 
this somewhat broader category, we identified ninety-three IPOs from 
the first half of 1983 which could have been studied without completely 
discarding Professor Alexander's concept of homogeneity or her basic 
universe--IPOs in a high-risk period for companies in high-risk indus-
tries.42 Therefore, Professor Alexander's study is far too small to 
provide grounds for a realistic assessment of all securities lawsuits . 
. 07302(8-1)/.18522 yields a value of 1.0875. We utilize the lower end of the distribution 
because we are calculating the probability of an abnonnally low sample standard 
deviation. The calculated value falls almost squarely between the Chi-square values at 
the 0.5 (.9893) and 1% (1.2390) levels. OTT & HILDEBRAND, supra note 29, at 748-49. 
Conversely, there is virtually no possibility that a random sample of 18 from a 
population with a true standard deviation of 7.30% would generate a sample standard 
deviation of 18.52%. Applying the same fonnula we get a ratio of .18522(18-1 )/.07302 
yielding a value of I 10.0189. Focusing now on the upper end of the distribution 
(because we are calculating the probability of an abnonnally high sample standard 
deviation), the calculated value is more than three times greater than the Chi-square 
value at the 0.5% level (35.7185). 
39. The principal function of venture capital is to provide "seed and startup 
financing for new businesses" in exchange for a long tenn equity investment in those 
businesses. See Jane Morris, An Overview of the Venture Capital Industry, in PRATT'S 
GUIDE TO VENTURE CAPITAL SOURCES 17 (Testa et al. eds., 1993). Typically, venture 
capital is provided by small venture capital investment companies organized for the 
purpose of locating attractive investments. 
40. Professor Alexander also limited her sample to offerings of at least 3 million 
shares priced at $12 per share or more. Alexander, supra note 5, at 517. We do not 
criticize these limitations. For a listing and discussion of the 42 cases, see infra tbls. 
2-A 1, 2-A2 and text accompanying notes 109-1 I 0. 
41. Alexander, supra note 5, at 508. 
42. See infra app. B and text accompanying notes 115-118. 
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b. Homogeneity of the Sample 
The most glaring problem in the sample selected by Professor 
Alexander is its homogeneity. Professor Alexander seeks to test a 
hypothesis about the effect of the "merits" on settlements of securities 
class actions generally. Typically, a study would seek a random sample 
drawn from the entire population, or at least from as large a subset as is 
reasonably possible. To the extent non-merit factors might be expected 
to affect settlement values, a model could be designed to explicitly 
account for those other factors.43 
Instead, Professor Alexander selected an exceedingly limited and 
homogenous sample. She describes the similarities of her sample cases 
as follows: 
The factual allegations and legal theories of these suits were virtually identical. 
The companies were in the same industry and the events complained of were 
contemporaneous, so external economic and market factors relevant to the 
lawsuits were the same for all cases. All but one of the suits were filed in the 
same judicial district, and there was significant overlap among the lawyers in 
the cases, especially on the plaintiffs' side.44 
Professor Alexander defends this selection by arguing that she has 
thereby provided control for variables other than the merits which might 
affect the value of the settlement: 
[T]hese cases are as similar as any set of actual complex cases is ever likely to 
be. 
Differences among the cases should thus be largely restricted to differences 
on the merits. If the actual outcomes (adjusted for the size of the claim) are the 
same, or if differences can be accounted for by factors other than the merits, 
this will strongly suggest that the merits did not affect the outcomes-contrary 
to both the economic model and the "common sense" view of settlement 
behavior.45 
In a simplistic fashion, the Alexander Study is attempting to statistical-
ly test the hypothesis that there is a correlation between the substantive 
merit of a case (the independent variable) and the value at which it will 
settle (the dependent variable). The asserted justification for choosing 
43. See, e.g., Orr & HILDEBRAND, supra note 29, chs. 13, 15-16; SUMMERS ET 
AL., supra note 28, chs. 13-14. 
44. Alexander, supra note 5, at 506; see also id. at 509. 
45. Id. at 506. Professor Alexander never explains what it is about the similarities 
she identifies that would lead one to conclude they might affect a case's settlement 
value. Later in the article she makes an unpersuasive attempt to address the more 
important aspect of that question, why it is that those similarities do not also suggest a 
similarity in the substantive merit of the eight cases, or more accurately, a similarity in 
the quality of evidence available to prove substantive merit. Id. at 522-23. 
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a narrow sample implicitly accepts that such a study should provide 
control for as many other relevant variables as possible.46 The econom-
ic settlement model, which Professor Alexander seeks to test in the 
securities class action context, posits that a party to litigation "makes its 
settlement decisions by comparing its expected economic position after 
a trial with its position if the settlement proposal is accepted, taking into 
account the costs of litigation and settlement.'"'7 The model would 
suggest that the factors which affect the amount of a settlement should 
include the strength of the case on the merits, the likelihood that any 
resulting judgment can be satisfied, the skill of the lawyers (both in 
terms of litigating the case and convincing their counterparts to settle), 
and, to a certain extent, the attitudes of the particular judge and jury who 
will hear the case. 
In contrast to her goal, Professor Alexander designed homogeneity 
controls for a host of irrelevant or marginally relevant characteristics 
while disregarding significant non-merits factors which could be 
expected to affect settlement value. By limiting her sample to suits 
arising from computer-related venture capital-backed IPOs in the first 
half of 1983, Professor Alexander arguably controls to a certain extent 
for the influence of lawyers, although hardly in a comprehensive fashion. 
She concludes there was "substantial overlap among the plaintiffs' 
lawyers"48 and some, but "less striking," overlap on the defense side.49 
Perhaps the similar geographic location of most of the cases may control 
for the attitudes of potential jurors. 
In all other respects, however, the similarities in Professor 
Alexander's sample do not control for the variables that one would 
expect might affect the amount of a settlement.50 Similar settlements, 
46. Id. at 506. While in theory all variables ( other than those being tested) should 
be held constant, in practical terms it is only relevant variables which pose a concern. 
For instance, to study the mechanical durability of various automobile makes, it should 
not be necessary to limit the sample to only cars of one particular color. 
47. Id. at 502. 
48. Id. at 509. 
49. Id. at 521. 
50. Professor Alexander does make the conclusionary assertion that "[s]ince the 
cases were brought in the same district, differences in expected outcomes based on 
differences in applicable law or the predilections of particular judges should also have 
been slight." Id. at 521. The case files reflect, however, that the nine cases were 
assigned to seven different judges. The fact that all of the cases were filed in district 
courts within the Ninth Circuit might control for differences in the law between circuits, 
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therefore, do not necessarily mean that the merits of the case are 
irrelevant. Professor Alexander completely disregards the possibility that 
in her small sample of cases, these uncontrolled-for factors (such as 
limited insurance coverage and a defendant's inability to satisfy a 
judgment) may mean that a strong case on the merits sometimes settles 
for about the same amount as a weaker case without similar problems.51 
More importantly, Professor Alexander has created a sample of cases 
which there is good reason to believe may not vary substantially on the 
merits.52 By selecting cases that are similar in a variety of irrelevant 
respects, Professor Alexander may have also selected cases which are 
similar in "merit" as well. If this is true, it would not be surprising to 
find that settlement values did not show significant variation. 
The nine cases studied by Professor Alexander are, by her own 
admission, a group of companies in the same business that went public 
at the same time and were exposed to similar market forces affecting 
their products and their stock. Moreover, they were sued under section 
11 of the Securities Act of 1933, a statute that affixes strict liability to 
issuers and a negligence standard to other defendants.53 Professor 
although Professor Alexander does not cite any relevant intercircuit conflicts. It certainly 
does not control for the "predilections of particular judges." 
51. Interestingly, in her most current article Professor Alexander expressly 
recognizes this phenomenon in a slightly different context, but fails to appreciate its 
implications for her original study: 
[l]n judging the effectiveness of a particular lawsuit in obtaining a recovery 
for the class, one must consider not only what a jury might have awarded, but 
also what could realistically be collected. Settlements, unlike judgments, are 
agreements on amounts that will actually be paid. If defendants do not have 
the assets to satisfy a judgment, it is not a fair criticism of the settlement that 
it is less than a potential judgment. Indeed, settlement for a lower amount 
may be in the class's best interest by preserving assets for payment to the class 
that would otherwise have been expended in litigating the case. 
Alexander, The Value of Bad News, supra note 17, at 1467 (footnotes omitted). In a 
footnote she goes on to assert that "[t]he prevalent economic models of settlement thus 
are incomplete in that they take into account the amount of a potential judgment and the 
probability that the plaintiff will prevail at trial, but do not include the amount of the 
potential judgment that can actually be collected." Id. at 1467 n.165. Whether this 
assertion is technically true as to developed theories of law and economics, certainly 
lawyers and courts have long recognized the importance of considering a defendant's 
ability to satisfy a judgment in realistically evaluating a settlement figure. See infra text 
accompanying notes 82-83. 
52. As we have previously indicated, the inadequate size of the sample merely 
compounds the problems engendered by its homogeneity. See infra note 39 and 
accompanying text. In many respects, the Alexander Study-focusing on 17 computer 
related IPOs from the first half of 1983-is comparable to conducting a pre-election poll 
of 25 voters drawn exclusively from either churchgoers in Peoria or social activists in 
Berkeley, and attempting to make national predictions. 
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a)-(b) (1933) (amended 1934); see Herman & MacLean v. 
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1983). 
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Alexander does not allow for the possibility that, in the hot IPO market 
of the first part of 1983, a number of computer companies may have 
opportunistically rushed toward the perceived IPO "window" too soon 
and made similar overly optimistic claims about their firm's prospects. 
When the result was negative for these companies, suits followed that all 
presented parallel questions as to whether the optimistic statements in the 
prospectuses were misleading given the competitiveness and other risks 
in the industry. 
There is at least anecdotal evidence to support such a theory. 54 The 
speculative public offering boom of 1982-1984--which encompasses the 
whole of the Alexander Study-is widely viewed as a "rip off' of public 
investors. Some of the primary participants in bringing these short-lived, 
high-tech successes to market have admitted their excesses: 
In the 1983 public offering frenzy, many high-tech companies sold newly 
issued stock to the public at top prices. Shortly afterward, the prices collapsed 
because of the shakeout in the computer industry or mismanagement. Investors 
were burned, and numerous shareholder lawsuits were filed against the 
companies and their underwriters. Hambrecht & Quist acted as underwriter for 
its share of such companies-Eagle, Diasonics and Wicat Systems, for 
example-although it was by no means alone. 
Mr. Volpe, who joined Hambrecht in I 98 I, about five years into a career as 
an East Coast investment banker, acknowledges that many such offerings 
probably should not have been made. "We wear hair shirts a lot around here, " 
he said.55 
54. In fact, the evidence may be more than anecdotal. A recent report describes 
studies by economists at UCLA which suggest an interesting but perhaps not completely 
surprising pattern for IPOs. 
Analyzing the long-term performance of flotations that took place between 
1980 and 1984, [these economists] found, in the first study, that firms typically 
went public after an unusually good set of results. After-tax profits of the 
firms in the sample on average rose in the financial year before the offering, 
then fell continuously until six years after it. Cash flow, too, rose in the year 
before the !PO, and fell during the one in which it took place, but then 
remained stable. 
Such deft timing could of course be due simply to good luck, or perhaps to 
demand from investors after a firm has performed well. However, there is a 
more sinister possibility, explored in the second study: that managers boost 
earnings artificially around the time of an offering in order to get the best 
possible price for their shares. 
Initial Public Offerings: Sheep and Goats, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, l 994, at 88. 
55. Andrew Pollack, Hambrecht & Quist Loses Its Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 
1985, §3 at I, 27 (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, Ronald Koenig, Chairman of Ladenburg, Thalmann & Co., 
has acknowledged, "[a] lot of companies went public that never should 
have gotten public money."56 
"Things came public that shouldn't have come public. Or they came public 
too soon," concedes Sandy Robertson of Robertson, Colman & Stephens, the 
San Francisco brokerage firm that did its share of high-tech new issues. (Some 
of which, like Tele Video, he wishes in hindsight he hadn't done.) 
The amounts of dollars raised were vast. "Companies were given the 
impression-both from corporate finance departments and venture cap 
people-that money was no object," says one seasoned money manager who 
follows the stocks. "You need money, we'll get it for you."" 
The Wall Street underwriters made millions on these public offerings, 
and the entrepreneurial controlling shareholders of the new public 
companies made many times more.58 Unfortunately, many of these 
new public companies had brilliant, but brief, careers. The huge losses 
suffered by investors were cited as a principal cause of the downturn in 
new offerings, which made entrepreneurial capital more difficult to 
obtain.59 
Professor Alexander argues that the merits should vary among her 
eight cases because the "degree of culpability and the evidence available 
to prove it" should differ.60 This assertion not only ignores the factors 
discussed above, but also the impact of section 11 and its strict liability 
standard.61 "Culpability" is irrelevant. If a breezy prospectus failed to 
identify the risks in the volatile computer market, and that same general 
failure was present in each prospectus prepared by the same set of 
underwriters and outside counsel, the claims under section 11 may well 
56. Michael Blumstein, Investors More Wary, N.Y. TIMES (City Ed.), Sept. 19, 
1984, at DI. 
57. Rhonda Brammer, IPO-R.I.P.?, BARRON'S, Oct. 14, 1985, at 16. 
58. See Alexander L. Taylor III, Making a Mint Overnight; "I Can Smell the 
Ferrari Now." Chants a Fresh Crop of Instant Multi-Millionaires, TIME, Jan. 23, 1984, 
at 44. 
59. Scott McMurray, Slumping Market In Initial Stock Offerings Squeezes Some 
Investment Banking Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1984, at 7. 
60. Alexander, supra note 5, at 514. 
61. See Robert A. Spanner, Limiting Exposure in the Offering Process, 20 REv. 
SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 59 ( I 987): 
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Everything that fails ... [the] test of hindsight then reappears in a securities 
class action complaint, which often consists of dozens of alleged inaccuracies 
and omissions concerning every conceivable aspect of the issuer's operations. 
It is a not an exaggeration to say that the typical prospectus lawsuit concerns 
not fraud, but simply mistakes or errors of judgment. 
This does not make such lawsuits ipso facto without merit. Section 11 
makes actionable every material misrepresentation or omission; scienter, or 
intent, need not be shown. That is, the issuer is strictly liable, regardless of 
what efforts it made to insure accuracy. 
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have been comparably strong. This is especially true when one factors 
in the necessarily imprecise nature of the settlement process. Thus, 
Professor Alexander's argument would be more credible if the applicable 
liability standard included a scienter requirement.62 
The Alexander Study preemptively rejects the possibility that a 
common error in the offering materials could lead to strict liability under 
section 11.63 It must be remembered, however, that the companies 
were all immature firms in the same business, at the same time, 
headquartered in the same geographic area, suggesting at least the 
possibility of a common entrepreneurial culture.64 When one adds to 
this mix the fact that the prospectuses in question were drafted with the 
assistance of virtually the same investment bankers and outside counsel, 
the probability of similar vulnerabilities-and comparably strong 
lawsuits-becomes even greater. L.F. Rothschild was the underwriter in 
five of the six offerings that Professor Alexander found had settled at the 
20-30 percent range. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro was issuer's counsel 
on two of the offerings and underwriters' counsel on two others, while 
Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati was underwriters' counsel on two 
offerings and issuer's counsel on another. In total, two of these three 
firms of professionals were involved in five of the six deals. 
This likelihood that the homogeneity of the suits affected the outcome 
becomes even greater when one examines the prospectuses for the six 
IPOs in which the suits did settle near 25 percent. Four of those 
prospectuses (Diasonics, Victor Technologies, Priam, and Activision) 
62. One commentator has criticized Professor Alexander on precisely this ground: 
Professor Alexander's analysis involved a study of class actions that were not 
predicated exclusively on violations of Rule I 0b-5. The cases were also 
predicated on violations of section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933--a critical 
distinction. Under section 11, an issuer of securities is held strictly liable for 
material misstatements and must prove nonnegligence. Thus, in contrast to 
Rule I 0b-5, actions under section 11 often render the usual facts of a case 
irrelevant. It is therefore not surprising to see similar settlement values in 
these cases. 
Ingber, supra note 12, at S361-62. 
63. Alexander, supra note 5, at 523. 
64. The homogeneity of Professor Alexander's study raises a host of issues which 
would not be present in a broader sample. For instance, is it possible a common 
business culture can foster securities law violations? See Ron Wolf, Valley Executives 
Flout SEC Rules-Agency's Failure To Curtail Delinquent Reporting of Stock Sales 
Breeds Contempt in Investment Community, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 28, 1993, 
at IC. 
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disclosed no risk factors at all, while the fifth (Masstor) contained only 
two perfunctory "risk" paragraphs. This aggressive approach to risk 
disclosure makes these five cases quite similar on a crucial point, and 
quite different from the current crop of high-tech IPOs, which are 
typically accompanied by prospectuses identifying several generic risk 
factors. 
Thus, the homogeneity of the sample undercuts Professor Alexander's 
central point. If one attempted to measure whether personal injury 
settlements varied according to the merits of the lawsuit, comparing 
eight cases involving students hit in crosswalks would not be adequate. 
Such cases might well settle in a narrow range of percentages of 
monetary damage, but the assumption that the merits varied substantially 
from case to case would be flawed. Here too, Professor Alexander's 
assumption that her eight cases must vary substantially on the merits is 
unfounded. 
c. Selective Inclusion and Exclusion 
Having created an abnormally small sample by design, Professor 
Alexander compounds the error by excluding some IPOs which appear 
to meet all her criteria.65 We found five additional venture capital-
backed IPOs which, from database summaries confirmed by company 
descriptions found in their prospectuses or annual reports, seem to fit her 
65. We say "appear" because it cannot be determined from Professor Alexander's 
article exactly how she decided which companies were "computer related." In a footnote 
following Table I, she explains how the seventeen IPOs listed in the table were 
assembled: 
"The list is largely derived from the annual survey of initial public offerings 
in Venture Capital Survey. . . . It includes all companies classified under the 
survey's industry headings 'Computers,' 'Computer Software and Services,' 
and 'Peripherals and Computer Related Products'. . . . (The Venture Capital 
Survey does not list the specific firms in each of the industry headings. The 
list was reconstructed by working with the staff of the Venture Capital Survey 
and using the company descriptions in prospectuses and VENTURE CAPITAL 
JOURNAL 1983 YEARBOOK 35-44)." 
Alexander, supra note 5, at 510 n.38. Thus, it is unclear whether responsibility for the 
omissions lies primarily with Professor Alexander or the staff of the Venture Capital 
Survey. 
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description on any objective basis.66 This omission calls into question 
the statistical rigor of even a properly designed study. 
Professor Alexander also includes one case which does not meet the 
criteria for her study as defined by her source publication, but is 
nonetheless cited as it shows results consistent with her hypothesis. 
According to Professor Alexander: 
Diasonics, Inc., is included in the sample although it is not classified within 
the computer-related industry headings in the Venture Capital Survey. The 
survey classified the company based on its product line of magnetic resonance 
imagery (MRI). I have included Diasonics as a computer-related company 
based on its product line of computer-enhanced X-ray equipment, which was 
more important to the company's near-term financial prospects than its MRI 
line and was the main source of the company's downfall. Diasonics was 
regarded as a comparable case by lawyers on both sides of the other sample 
cases. It was one of the largest IPOs of 1983, at $122 million, and resulted in 
one of the largest !PO-related securities class actions, filed in the same district 
as all but one of the other sample cases. 67 
Professor Alexander never explains how she came to question the 
characterization of Diasonics and she certainly never suggests she 
66. These five companies were initially identified by the descriptions in the 
Investment Dealer's Digest database as follows: Automatix ("develop robot-
ics/software"), Daisy Systems ("mnfr engineering computer syst"), LSI Logic ("mnfr 
semiconductors circuits"), Scientific Systems Services ("computer software services"), 
and VLSI Technology ("mnfr integrated circuits"). See infra note 115. 
The descriptions of the companies' business activities found in the prospectuses and 
annual reports were used to confirm that the companies were indeed computer related. 
AUTOMATJX INC., 1983 10-K REPORT I (1984) ("Automatix develops, manufactures, 
markets and services industrial robotic systems and artificial vision systems based on the 
Company's state-of-the-art computer hardware and software technology."); DAISY SYS. 
CORP., 1983 10-K REPORT 3 ("Daisy designs, manufactures, markets, and services 
computer-aided engineering (CAE) design systems for the electronics industry."); LSI 
LOGIC CORP., I 983 I 0-K REPORT 2 (I 984) ("LSI Logic Corporation designs, 
manufactures and markets application-specific computer-designable integrated circuits 
primarily based on gate array technology using a proprietary computer-based design 
automation system." (parentheticals omitted)); SCIENTIFIC SYS. SERVS., INC., PROSPEC-
TUS FOR OFFERING MARCH 22, 1983, at 3 (1983) ("[T]he Company's business continued 
its evolution from providing software development and software support to the 
Company's customers to designing and implementing integrated computer systems for 
complex monitoring and control applications."); VLSI TECHNOLOGY, INC., PROSPECTUS 
FOR OFFERING FEBRUARY 24, 1983, at 4 ("VLSI Technology, Inc. develops and markets 
a comprehensive system of products and services for the design of custom and 
semicustom very large scale integrated ("VLSI") circuits."). 
Each of the five companies is listed in our Table I-A. See infra text accompanying 
notes I 03-106. 
67. Alexander, supra note 5, at 510-1 I n.38. 
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reviewed all high-technology IPOs which occurred during the first half 
of 1983 to determine whether there were other companies more 
appropriately classed as "computer or computer-related."68 The 
problem, of course, is one of consistency. When performing a statistical 
study, either the data should be taken as it is given in the source material 
or, if the source is questionable on a point, comprehensive adjustments 
should be made in a consistent and neutral fashion. Professor 
Alexander's adjustments appear to be anything but comprehensive or 
consistent. 
2. Adjustment and Omission of Key Data 
Having begun with unrepresentative data, Professor Alexander then 
proceeded to adjust and edit the limited data available until it was 
consistent with her hypothesis. 
Consider first Professor Alexander's manipulation of the "stakes" in 
WICAT.69 The WICAT initial public offering of 4 million shares was 
at $18 per share. If the IPO price was used to calculate the "stakes"-as 
was done with the other companies-the $6.25 million settlement would 
have been 14.2 percent, a substantial deviation from the 25 percent 
hypothesis. Professor Alexander, however, suggests it would be 
appropriate to substitute what she calls the "stabilized" post-offering 
price of WICAT ($13 per share) for the initial price. With this 
adjustment, "the settlement equals 26 percent of the adjusted stakes,"70 
consistent with her hypothesis.71 
Similar subjective adjustments, however, could be made in many of 
the cases, undermining the evidence of a purported "going rate." 
Strikingly similar to WICAT is the case of Fortune Systems,72 in which 
the stock price declined immediately after the offering and "stabilized" 
68. We applied our consistent criteria to check on the exclusion ofDiasonics. See 
infra note 118. The Investment Dealer's Digest database describes the company business 
as "Mfr Med Imaging Sys," which does not suggest a computer-related endeavor. 
Diasonics is included in our expanded study of all 1983 high technology IPOs. See infra 
app. B, this. 4-Bl, 4-B2, notes I 15-124 and accompanying text. 
69. In re WICAT Sec. Litig., No. C-83-11176 (D. Utah 1983); see Alexander, 
supra note 5, at 518-19. 
70. Id. 
71. Curiously, in a footnote, Professor Alexander expresses "some hesitation" in 
suggesting a selective adjustment, acknowledging that the same sort of argument could 
be made in two other cases. Id. at 519 n.71. She nonetheless relies on the adjustment 
in the text of her article without considering the impact of similar adjustments in the 
other cases. 
72. In re Fortune Sys. Sec. Litig., 680 F. Supp. 1360, 1362 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
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at $16 per share.73 Indeed, as Professor Alexander recognizes in 
another portion of her article,74 defendants in Fortune Systems success-
fully brought a motion for summary judgment to exclude any damages 
attributable to the decline in stock price between March 4, the date of 
the offering, and May 12, the date the company made the first adverse 
disclosure.75 Instead of recognizing this fact pattern as analogous to 
WICAT, Professor Alexander treats the summary judgment as though it 
was indicative of a weak case on the merits and argues the Fortune 
Systems settlement demonstrates that the merits had no effect.76 
The stock price movement in a third case, Activision,11 exhibits a 
pattern similar to that in WICAT and Fortune Systems. From an offering 
price of $12 per share, the stock declined to $10 in the two weeks 
following the offering, and remained between $8 and $10 until the 
adverse disclosures, which led to suit. Again, as in Fortune Systems, the 
result in Activision would not fit Professor Alexander's "25 percent" 
settlement hypothesis if the "stakes" were adjusted by using $8-10 as the 
"stabilized" price. 
Thus, the central principle of consistency was once again not adhered 
to in the Alexander Study. If a statistical study requires adjustments in 
the data, the same adjustment must be made for all similar circumstanc-
es. If a fact is treated as merits-related in one case, that same fact 
cannot be treated as non-merits-related in another.78 
73. If the $ I 6 "stabilized" price is used to calculate the market loss, the Fortune 
Systems settlement was a striking 64 % of the theoretical "stakes." See In Camera, 
supra note l 3, at 70. 
74. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 519-21. 
75. Fortune Sys., 680 F. Supp. at 1362. 
76. Alexander, supra note 5, at 5 I 9-21. Part of the problem here may be 
definitional. When we colloquially speak of the "merits," we are generally referring to 
the strength of the evidence in establishing a defendant's liability under the applicable 
substantive standard. Thus, the "merits" may be strong but the damages minimal. On 
the other hand, even when liability is certain, a case may be viewed as weak on the 
"merits" where the plaintiff is unable to prove causation or substantial damages. From 
the perspective of the Alexander Study, the problem with the latter approach is that it 
incorporates multiple variables under a single heading. A case with substantial damages 
but questionable liability might settle for roughly the same amount as one with near 
certain liability but much lesser provable damages. To say that the "merits" had no 
effect under these circumstances would be to ignore the impact of two quite different 
considerations. 
77. In re Activision Sec. Litig., No. C-83-4639(A)-MHP (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
78. As Professor Alexander clearly recognizes elsewhere, adjustments of this sort 
introduce a subjective element into the process. Alexander, supra note 5, at 516. Did 
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Similar deficiencies exist in Professor Alexander's treatment of the 
data regarding Eagle Computers. The $1.95 million Eagle Computers19 
settlement, which yielded a low settlement percentage of 8.6 percent, is 
deemed irrelevant by Professor Alexander due to the lack of available 
defendant funds or insurance coverage.80 We cannot take issue with 
the notion that collectability problems often result in settlements which 
are lower than they might otherwise be.81 Indeed, experienced attor-
neys and judges would undoubtedly confirm the fact that recoverable 
assets are one of the first two factors discussed in almost any settlement 
negotiation, and typically (along with Professor Alexander's focus, the 
"merits") drive the talks. 82 But Professor Alexander, having analyzed 
this issue as to Eagle Computers, fails to examine the remaining cases 
to see if similar collectability problems were present in any of those. 
As was the case with the stakes adjustment in WICAT and Fortune 
Systems, Professor Alexander's treatment of the issuer insolvency factor 
appears to vary depending on the destination of her argument. In Eagle 
Computers, the company's bankruptcy was deemed a non-merits 
explanation for an unusually low settlement.83 Later, however, in 
the price actually stabilize and, if so, at what price? In reality, "stabilized" price 
adjustments are merely one variant of the central causation issue present in virtually 
every securities action: What portion of the price inflation of the stock is attributable 
to the misstatement or nondisclosure? 
79. In re Eagle Computers Sec. Litig., No. C-84-20382(A)SW (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
80. Id. at 517-18. 
81. See, e.g., Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders ofTMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. 
v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 ( I 968) Gudge approving settlement must consider 
"possible difficulties of collecting on any judgment which might be obtained"); Class 
Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1295 (9th Cir. 1992) ("settling defendant's 
ability to pay may be a proper factor to be considered in evaluating a proposed class 
action settlement"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953 (1992); Grunin v. Int'! House of 
Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 124 (8th Cir.) (court reviewing proposed class action settlement 
"should consider such factors as the defendant's overall financial condition and ability 
to pay"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (I 975). Fans of baseball, in particular, should see 
also N. County Contractor's Ass'n, Inc. v. Touchstone Ins. Servs., 27 Cal. App. 4th 
1085, 1094, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 166, 172 (1994)("settlement took into account all available 
[insurance] coverage"). 
82. See, e.g., Jack W. Londen, Counseling Clients on Securities Litigation Risk, 
in CALIFORNIA MCLE MARATHON 1994 SECURITIES LAW UPDATE 7, 51 (David Siegel 
& Bruce G. Vanyo co-chairs, 1994) (on file with authors). In fact, the provision of Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(J)(D) (formerly subdivision (b)(2)), requiring automatic disclosure of 
any insurance policies potentially providing coverage for a judgment, was expressly 
designed to facilitate settlement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note on 
subdivision (b)(2), 1970 amendment. See generally Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 426 
(I 973). 
83. Alexander, supra note 5, at 517-18. 
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Professor Alexander's discussion of Victor Technologies,84 issuer 
insolvency was listed as a "significant litigation event" which "surprised" 
Professor Alexander because it did not cause the settlement to vary from 
the 25 percent range.85 If a company's bankruptcy explains why an 8 
percent settlement is lower than it otherwise would have been, why does 
it not also suggest that a 27 percent settlement would have been two or 
three times greater had funds been available? 
The unavailability of funds to satisfy a judgment was hardly unique 
to Eagle Computers and Victor Technologies. Another portion of 
Professor Alexander's article notes that the issuer in Priam was also in 
bankruptcy. 86 Poor issuer financial condition was also present in the 
Activision, Masstor, and TeleVideo cases.87 Nonexistent or impaired 
director and officer insurance coverage was a factor in those cases and 
in Priam88 as well. 89 Thus, several of Professor Alexander's "going 
rate" 25 percent settlements might well have been higher if adequate 
funds were available. To return to a familiar theme, Professor 
Alexander's adjustments are not consistent. 
84. In re Victor Technologies Sec. Litig., No. C-83-3906(A)RFP(FW) (N.D. Cal. 
1983). 
85. Alexander, supra note 5, at 519-21. 
86. Id. at 519. 
87. See Application For and Memorandum in Support of an Award of Attorneys' 
Fees, Costs and Expenses at 28, 38, In re Activision Sec. Litig., No. C-83-4639(A)-MHP 
(N.D. Cal. document filed Apr. 13, !987); Declaration of Paul F. Bennett Re: History 
and Nature of This Litigation at 6-7, In re Masstor Sys. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-84-
20559(A)-RPA (N.D. Cal. document filed Oct. 6, !988); Declaration of Leonard B. 
Simon in Support of Final Approval of Settlement at 6, Cooper v. Hwang, No. C-86-
20146-W AI (N.D. Cal. document filed Feb. 15, 1991) (TeleVideo). 
88. Weinberger v. Schroeder, No. C-84-20757-WAI (N.D. Cal. 1990) (Priam). 
89. See Application For and Memorandum in Support ofan Award Of Attorneys' 
Fees, Costs and Expenses at 28, In re Activision Sec. Litig., No. C-83-4639(A)-MHP 
(N.D. Cal. document filed Apr. 13, 1987); Declaration of Paul F. Bennett Re: History 
and Nature of This Litigation at 6-7, In re Masstor Sys. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-84-
20559(A)-RP A (N.D. Cal. document filed Oct. 6, 1988); Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Application for Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of 
Expenses at 5, Weinberger v. Schroeder, No. C-84-20757-WAI (N.D. Cal. document 
filed July 20, I 990) (Priam); Declaration of Leonard B. Simon in Support of Final 
Approval of Settlement at 6, Cooper v. Hwang, No. C-86-20146-WAI (N.D. Cal. 
document filed Feb. 15, 199!) (TeleVideo). 
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3. Arithmetic and Data Errors 
The Alexander Study also contains a number of arithmetic and data 
errors which are listed in Appendix A of this Article. The majority are 
minor, although taken as a whole they tend to undermine the scientific 
rigor of the study. Several of the errors, however, are significant enough 
to warrant specific comment. 
In Professor Alexander's critical Table 4, Victor Technologies is 
shown with a settlement percentage of 26.87 percent90 when the actual 
percentage should be 29.63 percent.91 Thus, one of Professor 
Alexander's "25 percent results" is actually 30 percent. 
Professor Alexander's Table 3 employs a different data set-the twelve 
worst-performing IPOs of 1983. This includes cases other than those 
listed in her initial sample of seventeen (for example, non-computer 
companies and IPOs from the second half of 1983) and is used to 
support her conclusion that every company whose IPO generated 
"stakes" of more than $20 million was sued, while none that generated 
lesser "stakes" were sued. She goes on to hypothesize that "stakes" of 
$20 million are necessary to generate an attorneys' fee award of 
sufficient size to justify the time and expense of a class action.92 
Professor Alexander's alternate data set of worst-performing IPOs is 
simply inaccurate. Far from confirming her conclusion, the correct data 
suggests lawsuits are filed based on something other than the theoretical 
"stakes" in the case. Of the six IPOs in Table 3 (of the Alexander 
Study) with "stakes" less than $20 million, we discovered that two (ATV 
Systems and Clinical Data) resulted in lawsuits.93 Each had hypotheti-
cal "stakes," as defined by Professor Alexander, ofless than $5 million.94 
90. Alexander, supra note 5, at 517. 
91. See infra app. A, at 4. A lesser, but nonetheless significant, error in the case 
of Priam results in an increase in the settlement percentage from 20.63 to 22.62%. Id. 
92. Alexander, supra note 5, at 513 n.46. 
93. Professor Alexander explained that she examined the annual reports of these 
companies from 1983-1989 to determine whether suits had been filed. Id. at 511 n.41. 
This does not explain the omission of the Clinical Data lawsuit, which was revealed in 
Clinical Data's 10-K for 1985. CLINICAL DATA CORP., 1985 10-K REPORT 15 (1986). 
In any event, we question Professor Alexander's decision to rely solely on self-
disclosure. Securities class action lawsuits are not universally revealed in annual reports 
because corporate managers exercise discretion in determining whether a lawsuit is 
"material" to the company. For instance, the ATV suit was not disclosed in the 1987 
10-K even though the company was sued in January of that year. We were aware of the 
case because it was prosecuted by our office. See Class Action Complaint, Knapp v. 
Gomez (ATV) No. 87-0067 (S.D. Cal. document filed Jan. 20, 1987). 
94. As can be determined from our expanded study, the ATV case is inconsistent 
with Professor Alexander's conclusions in other ways. See infra text accompanying 
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4. Failure to Adjust for Potential Damages 
The "stakes" for a lawsuit or potential lawsuit are important to the 
Alexander Study in two ways. In analyzing IPOs as potential lawsuits 
to determine when companies are sued, Professor Alexander argues that 
a lawsuit was filed whenever the gross damages or market loss 
("stakes") were at least $20 million. Calculating the "stakes" for this 
purpose, Professor Alexander uses an arbitrary date of March 30, 1984 
as the "closing" price for the stock, subtracts that number from the IPO 
price, and multiplies it by the number of shares in the offering.95 
In analyzing the lawsuits that were filed, the "stakes" also provide the 
baseline from which the settlement percentage is calculated. For this 
purpose, the "stakes" are calculated in a somewhat different fashion, as 
the "closing" price for the stock is determined as of the last day of the 
class period in the lawsuit rather than the arbitrary date of March 30, 
1984.96 
Professor Alexander recognizes her method of calculating "stakes" 
provides only a "rough" approximation of the theoretical damages in a 
particular case.97 She explains that taking into account other admittedly 
relevant factors "would require determinations about the merits, and 
would thereby introduce the possibility of disagreement about the 
amount at stake. The amount that plaintiffs could reasonably claim as 
damages is the most objective, least controversial, and most easily 
calculated approach. "98 
Unfortunately, the gross losses or "stakes" employed by Professor 
Alexander are not particularly significant to an experienced securities 
lawyer and, contrary to her assertion, this figure could not "reasonably 
notes 115-124. After partial settlements of$1.953 million with ATV's underwriters and 
some venture capital firms and individual defendants, the case was tried against certain 
of A TV's officers and its independent public accountants, resulting in a plaintiffs' verdict 
which was affirmed on appeal. See Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 
1996). Thus it was a small case which nonetheless resulted in a suit. It went to trial, 
which is contrary to Professor Alexander's findings that this virtually never happens with 
small cases. It yielded partial settlements far in excess of 25% of the "stakes." 
95. Alexander, supra note 5, at 511. 
96. Id. at 515. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 515-16. 
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[be] claim[ed] as damages."99 As Professor Alexander recognizes, 
section 11 generally provides that a plaintiff may only recover the 
difference between the price paid and the value on the date the lawsuit 
is filed, less any amount defendants can prove was caused by factors 
other than the misrepresentations or omissions in the registration 
statement. 100 Thus, any experienced practitioner must look at what the 
market (or the relevant segment of the market) was doing during the 
same time period, understanding that only the investors' losses net of the 
relevant market are likely recoverable.101 A stock which loses 15 
percent of its value during a period in which the entire market loses 20 
percent of its value (as was the case in October 1987) will not likely 
generate a successful lawsuit. Using a less extreme scenario, a stock 
which loses 15 percent of its value while the relevant market loses 10 
percent of its value has probably suffered only a 5 percent recoverable 
loss. These rules are not immutable, but they apply in the vast majority 
of cases and are an important part of the damage and settlement calculus. 
Thus, in determining the "stakes" in a case, the Standard & Poors 500 
or, more often, a narrower sector index is generally plotted against the 
stock in question to estimate the recoverable loss. There can, of course, 
be dispute as to which index to use, and different indices will yield 
somewhat different damages. But the fact that there may be differences 
of opinion as to which index to utilize in making a conceptually 
necessary adjustment is hardly a justification for dispensing with any 
attempt. 
IV. REPERFORMING THE ALEXANDER STUDY 
Having critiqued the methodology of the Alexander Study in several 
significant respects, we now endeavor to present the statistical results 
which the study yields when the errors are corrected. In the first 
instance, we correct errors but maintain the essential design of the 
Alexander Study, focusing on computer-related IPOs during the first half 
of 1983. In the second section, we expand the study to include all high-
tech IPOs during all of 1983. 
99. Id. at 516 (emphasis omitted). 
100. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1995); see Alexander, supra note 5, at 515 n.55. 
IOI. See, e.g., Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Feit v. 
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544,586 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); see also 
Entin v. Barg, 412 F. Supp. 508, 515 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (approving a settlement and, in 
noting the general decline of similar stocks, observing that "full recovery at trial would 
[likely J have only been a fraction of our $6,530,000 base figure"). 
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A. The Study as Designed 
Table 1 in the Alexander Study provides general information about the 
seventeen IPOs during the first half of 1983 which the study classed as 
"computer and computer-related."102 Our Table 1-A (following page) 
provides the same information for the forty-two computer and computer-
related IPOs we found. 103 The table includes sixteen cases from 
Professor Alexander's list but excludes Diasonics.104 It also adds five 
venture capital-backed offerings that Alexander did not include and 
twenty-one non-venture capital-backed offerings. These data will 
provide the basis for our attempts to reperform the Alexander Study as 
she designed it, but without the errors, omissions, and adjustments we 
previously identified. 105 
I. Incidence of Suits 
The first question Professor Alexander seeks to address is when a 
company will be sued for securities law violations arising from an IPO. 
Table 2 lists Professor Alexander's seventeen cases by the decline in 
market capitalization and attempts to show that any company with a 
theoretical gross market loss in excess of $20 million was sued while no 
company with a gross market loss of less than $20 million was sued. 
This conclusion is purportedly buttressed by Professor Alexander's Table 
3, which claims to show the twelve worst-performin'& IPOs of 1983 
ranked in order of percentage decline in market value. 1 Although the 
decline in market capitalization is not calculated for the companies in 
Table 3, Professor Alexander suggests the two charts together show "that 
102. Alexander, supra note 5, at 510. 
103. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
I 04. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
105. The first seven tables are enumerated to correspond to the tables in the 
Alexander Study. Thus, Table 1-A corresponds to Professor Alexander's Table 1, Tables 
2-Al and 2-A2 are variations on Professor Alexander's Table 2, and Tables 4-Al, 4-A2, 
4-Bl, and 4-B2 are successive variations on Alexander's Table 4. Beginning with 
Table 5, there is no correlation between the tables here and those in the Alexander 
Study. 





Table 1-A: Analysis of Computer-Related IPOs - - Fr-st Half of 1983 
(1) (2) 
1 ..... ll<Jsinen 
Fortune Systems Mfr desktop computers 
Victor Technok>gies Mfr mrc:rocomputers 
Wicat Systems Mfr mtc:rocomputer sys 
Al:.tMsiOn Mfr computer games 
Priam Mfr disk dn-..es 
MASSTOR Systems Mfr computer mass storage 
LSI Loge Mfr semconductor circuits 
Televideo Systems Mfr w:teo dt,play terminals 
Eagle Computer Mfr microcomputer sys 
Micropoks Mfr disk dri\le'S 
DST Systems Dev mutual rund sol'twr 
Computer Language Research Tax processing sofrwr/svc 
American Software Develop computer softwr 
Cook Dalll 5erw:es OeY computer sonwr 
Automat1x Develop roboticstsonwr 
Penta Sys1ems International Computer typography sys 
Hale Systems Satellrte/radar sys/softwr 
Norsk Oa1a (AOAJ Mfr mimcomputers 
SGS Systems Develop/market software 
Spectravtdeo Mk1 v.deogames/eqp/so11wr 
Teleram Communications Mfr portab$e computer/eqp 
Scientific Systems Semces Computer softwr svc 
Key Trank: Mfr computer keyboards 
CONSCO Ente,p-oses Dev softwr sys 
MacNeal-Sc:hwendler Dev engineering softwr 
Status Game Mfr videogame machines 
Quality Micro Systems Mfr graphic processor 
lnterand Mf tekMdeo graphk: sys 
Astra-Med Mfr computer graphic sys 
SterNng Software Oev/mkt softwr prods 
Primages Mfr datSy wheel punter 
Systems Associates Dev hosprtal comp sys 
Amherst Associates Hospital computer svc 
Avant-Garde Computing Mkt data network softwr 
VLSI Technology Mfr kilegrated circuits 
Drstributed l.oglC Mfr disk/tape controllers 
Integrated SOttware Systems Dev softwr/graphics 
MPSf Group Oevsoftwr 
Xebec Mfr disk drives 
Da1Sy Systems Engineering compuler sys 
Information Resources Dev soflwr consumer goods 
Apollo Computer ._ Mfr computer sys 














































(4) (5) (8) m (e) (9) (10) 
Oec:Nno In 
Mar1cet 
Mar1cet Marlco!Ca1 Cap. asot Ven1\J19 
Shares Issue I~~\., Price at ·- - Capl1al _(mil.I Price 3- ~I.I "''"'I.I Bocked? 5.000 $22.00 St10.000 $5.125 $25.825 $&4.375 Yes 
4.500 $17.50 $78.750 S0.875 $3.931! $74 ,813 Yes 
• 000 $18.00 $72.000 $3.750 $15.000 $57,000 Yes 
4000 $12.00 $48.000 $1.875 $7.500 S.00.500 Yes 
3 .850 $17.00 $85.450 $8.750 $33 .... $31 .763 Yes 
3000 $16,00 $48.000 $8.250 S18.750 $29.250 Yes 
7 .000 $21 .00 $147 .000 $17.000 $119.000 $26.000 Yes 
6 .250 S1800 $112.500 S13.750 $85 938 $26.583 Yes 
2.750 $12.00 $33.000 $3825 sg_909 $23.031 Yes 
2363 $17.00 $40171 sg_375 S22.153 $18.018 Yes 
1 250 $26.00 $32.500 $15.500 $19,375 $13.125 No 
2.000 $21 .00 S.2.000 S14.750 $29.500 $12.500 No 
1.750 $24 .00 $42.000 $17.125 $29.- $12.031 No 
0 .650 $16.00 $10.400 $3.375 S2.194 $8.206 No 
1.293 $19.00 $24.567 $12.750 $18.488 $8.081 Yes 
1188 $12.50 $14 854 $7.000 $8.318 $6.536 Yes 
0 .900 $13.00 $11 .700 $6.000 $5.400 $6.300 No 
1500 S37.75 $58 .825 $34 .000 $51 .000 $5.625 No 
1200 $18.00 $21 .800 $13.500 $16.200 $5.400 No 
1.000 $6.25 $6.250 S0.875 S0.875 $5.375 No 
0.700 $7 50 $5.250 $1 .000 S0.700 $4.550 No 
1 000 $11 .75 $11 .750 $7.750 $7.750 $4.000 Yes 
2 260 $19.50 s.◄ .070 $17.750 S.00.115 $3.955 No 
0.714 S700 ,. ... $1.750 $1 .250 S3.749 No 
1 300 $23.00 S29.900 S20.250 $26.325 $3.575 No 
0775 $5.50 $4263 S2 250 $1 .744 $2.519 No 
0 950 $17.00 S16 150 $15.675 $15.081 $1.()69 Yes 
0 .950 $1000 $9.500 $9.250 $8.788 S0.713 No 
0350 $9.00 $3.150 $8.125 $2.844 S0.306 No 
1700 $900 $15.300 $8875 $15.088 SO 212 No 
0900 $7.00 $8300 $7.500 $8.750 (S0.•50 Yes 
0900 S1600 $14.400 $17250 $15.525 ($1 125 No 
0770 $1500 $11 .550 $17.000 $13.090 ($15'0 Yes 
1 800 $1600 $30080 $17.000 $31 .960 ($1.800 No 
4 .000 S1300 $52.000 S13 500 $54.000 1s2.ooo Yes 
0 .800 $7,00 $5.800 S10500 $8400 ($2 800 No 
1.402 $16.00 S22.424 $18.500 $25.928 ($3 .504 YH 
1 000 $12.00 $12.000 $18 500 $18.500 ($4 500 No 
1300 $17 00 $22.100 $22.000 $28.600 ($6.500 No 
2.000 $1550 $31 000 $24.250 $48.500 ($17 500 Yes 
1150 $2300 $26 450 $49.000 $58.350 ($29.900 Yes 
4 000 S2200 S88 000 L. $34 _875 1--S.1.3.!._.5:()0 _ ($51..:500 ~
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suits alleging securities violations were filed whenever the stock price 
declined sufficiently following the IPO to support an award of attorneys' 
fees that would make it worthwhile to bring a case."107 
The conceptual approach of Professor Alexander's Table 2 has been 
reproduced and the data corrected in our Tables 2-Al and 2-A2 
(following pages). Table 2-Al shows the twenty-one venture capital-
backed computer related IPOs during the first half of 1983 ranked 
according to the decline in market capitalization as of March 30, 1984. 
Although there is certainly a correlation between the decline in market 
capitalization and whether a company is sued, the starkness of Professor 
Alexander's $20 million "magic line" has begun to disappear. LSI 
Logic, a company which suffered a $28 million decline in market 
capitalization, was not sued. Automatix, a company which suffered a 
mere $8 million decline, was sued. Even relying on this small sample, 
it cannot be said that decline in market capitalization is the only factor 
which determines whether a company is sued. 
Expanding the size of the sample confirms this conclusion. The next 
table, Table 2-A2 lists all forty-two computer-related IPOs during the 
first half of 1983. Two more cases a~pear which are inconsistent with 
Alexander's $20 million threshold. 1 8 Cook Data Services, which 
suffered an $8 million decline in market capitalization, and Avant-Garde 
Computing which is shown with an increase in market capitalization, 
were both subject to securities class action lawsuits. 109 
107. Id. at 513. 
I 08. This inconsistency is confirmed when Professor Alexander's Table 3 is 
corrected. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95. Of the six worst-performing IPOs 
of I 983 with market capitalization losses of less than $20 million, two ( or one-third of 
the total) were nevertheless sued for securities law violations. 
109. See Betje Partners v. Cook Data Services, Inc., No. CA-3-83-2310-F (N.D. 
Tex. 1983); In re Avant-Garde Computing Sec. Litig., No. 85-4149 (D.N.J. 1985). 
These two companies also illustrate another problem in Professor Alexander's Table 2 
methodology. The "stakes" in any given case are properly defined not by the decline 
in market capitalization on some particular arbitrary date (e.g., March 30, 1984), but 
rather by the market loss on the last day of the class period or, where no lawsuit is filed, 
on the day which could have been selected as the last day of the class period. For 
instance, in the case of Cook Data Sewices, using the market price in March 1984 is 
misleading because the class period ended in July 1983. The actual decline in market 
capitalization for purposes of the suit was $3.6 million, a far cry from Alexander's $20 
million "magic" line. Illustrating the other side of the coin is Avant-Garde Computing, 
which had an extraordinarily long class period ending in July 1985. The decline in 
market capitalization at that point was $13.1 million, a significant decrease but still less 





Table 2-A.1 : Analyala ofComputm-Aetat.d IPO• -- Ars1 Half of 1983 (Venture Capital Bachd) 
(1) (2) (3) <•> 
,...., Sha,oa , . ...., Busln•n Oat• lmif,l 
Fortune Syfllm• Mfr desktop computers 04-Mar-83 5.000 
Vlc1or Technologlea Mfr mlctocomput•t• 23-Mar-83 , .500 
Wical Syatema Mfr microcomputer •Y• 30-Jun - 83 , .ooo 
Activislon Mfr computw garNs 09-Jun - 83 , .ooo 
Priam Mfr disk drlws 02-Jun-83 3.850 
MASSTOR Systems Mfr comput•r ma .. sto,ag• 25-Mot-83 3,000 
LSI Logic Mft' Nmlconductor circulls 13-May-83 7,000 
T•l...-id.o sy .. m• Mfr video dlaplay tarmlnal1 15-Mar-113 15.250 
Eagle Computec Mfr microcomputer •Y• 15-Jun-83 2.750 
Mlaopotis Mfr disk dr~• 03-Jun-83 2.383 
Au1omatix Oev-elop robotlcl/aoftwr 0I-Mar-83 1,293 
Penta. Syst•m• lntern•tfonal Computer typography •Y• 15-Mat-83 1.198 
Scient111c Sy••m• SeNlcea Comput.rsoftwfsvc 22-Mat-83 1.000 
Quality Miao Syst•m• Mfr graphic processor 14-Jan-83 0.950 
Prima;•• Mtr daisy wheel prlnlar 11-May-83 0,900 
Amherst AuodatH Hospttal computer &\IC 08 - Jun-83 0.770 
VLSI Tkhnology Mfr lntegratad circuits 24-Feb-83 4,000 
lntegra.:t Softwate s.,...m• Dev softwr/graphlc• 23-Mat-83 1.402 
0aJsySymm, EnglnfftinQ compul•r sys 0I-Jun-83 2.000 
Information Allsourcas O.v aoftwr consumer goods CM-Mar-83 1.150 
I ADotlo Comouter Mfr ,...._,.U1er SYS 03-Mat-83 , .ooo 

























(6) (7) (0) (0) (10) (11) 
Oedlneln 
Ma1bt 
Mark•t M.,kelC■ Cap.uaf ......... , 
Cap. at Price at at'J/30/ .. 3/30/9' Lou 
IPOISmU,\ 3/30/ .. 'Smll.' ISmil,1 lorG.lnl &,ad? 
$110.000 $5.125 $25.625 1&4.375 7G.7'Xt v .. 
178.750 $0.1175 $3,11311 $74'.813 95,o,< y., 
$72,000 $3.750 $15,000 157.000 79.2" y., 
$411.000 $1 .875 $7.500 W,,500 M .41' v .. 
$65.'450 $8.750 133.581 '31.763 48.5" y., 
$48.000 $6.250 $18.750 $29.250 "°·"" y., $147.000 $17.000 $119,000 '21.000 19,ln, No 
$11 2.500 $13.750 $85.938 $28.563 23.IS'I, y., 
$33.000 $3.625 $9.969 $23.031 69.ll" Yo, 
$40. 171 $9.375 $22.153 $18.018 44.9'1. No ' 
$24.567 112.750 $18.4156 $8,081 ...... y., 
$14,854 $7.000 $0.318 , ... ,. 44.0'Jf. No 
111.750 $7.750 $7.750 S,,000 34,o,< No 
$16.150 $15.875 $15.081 $1.069 15.6 .. No 
$6.300 $7.500 $8.750 (SO.•~ -7.1% No 
111.550 117.000 $13.090 (S1 ,34C -13.3'1, No 
$52,000 $13.500 154.000 (S2,00C -3.8% No 
$22.424 $18.500 $25.928 ($3,'°' -15.69' No 
$31.000 $24.250 $48,500 ($17.!IOC -56.5,&, No 
$26.450 $49.000 $58,350 (S2UOC -113.o,J, No 




Table 2-A2: Analysis of An Computer-Related IPOs - - Finl Half ol 1983 
(1) (2) (3) 
Issue 
ksuer Business Cate 
Fortune Systems Mir desktop computers 04 - Mar- 83 
Victo, Technologies Mir microcomputers 23 - Mor-83 
Wical Systems Mir microcomputer sys 30-Jun-83 
Activision Mir compu1er games 09-Jun-83 
Priam Mir disk drives 02-Jun-83 
MASSTOR Systems Mir computer mass storage 25-Miu-83 
LSI Logic Mir semiconductor cirt:uits 13 - May-83 
Televideo Syslems Mir video display terminaB 15-Mar-83 
Eagle Computer Mir microcomputer sys 15-Jun-83 
Micropolis Mir disk drives 03 - Jun-83 
OST Systems Dev mutl.lal lund sottwr 16 - Mar-83 
Computer language Resean:h Tax processing softwrfs~ 27-May-83 
Ame,ican Software Develop computer softwr 24-Feb - 83 
Cook Data Services Dev computer sottwr OI - Feb-83 
Automatix Develop robotics/softwr 01-Mar-83 
Penta Systems fntemldional Computer typogr-i,hy sys 15-Mar-83 
Hale Systems Satellite/rader sys/sottwr 21-Jun-83 
Norsk Data (AORJ Mir minicomputers 27 - May-83 
BGS Syslems Develop/market software 03-Jun-83 
Spectravideo Mkt videogames/eqp/sottwr 11-May-83 
Teleram Communications Mfr portable computer/eqp 26-May-83 
Scientific Syslerr. Servicn Computer softwr s~ 22-Mar-83 
KeyTronic Mfr computer keyboards 22-Jun-83 
CONSCO Enterprises Devsonwrsys 11-May-83 
MacNeal - Schwandler Dev engineering sottwr 05-May-83 
Status Game Mir videogame machines 25- Mar-83 
Quality Micro Syslems Mir graphic processor 14 - Jan- 83 
lnterand Mf lelevideo graphic sys 02-Jun-83 
Miro-Med Mfr computer graphic sys 25-May-83 
Ster~ng Software Oev/mkt 5oftwr prod5 04-May-83 
Primages Mir daisy wheel printer tl-May- 83 
Systems Associates Dev hospital comp sys 20-May-83 
Amheist Associates Hosp ital computer svc 08-Jun-83 
Avant - Garde Computing Mkt data network sottwr 30-,Am-83 
VLSI T1chnology Mir integrated circuits 24-feb - 83 
Distributed logic Mir disk/tape controllers 02-Jun-83 
Integrated Software Systems Oevsoftwr/graphics 23- Mar-83 
MPSI Group Devsottwr 02-Mar-83 
Xebec Mfr disk drives 01-Mar-83 
Dai5ySy5tems Engineering computer sys 01-Jun- 83 
11'llo1mation Resoun:es Dev sottwr consumer goods 04-Mat-83 
Anollo Comouter Mfrcomnutersus 03 - Ma, 83 




, .ooo $22.00 
4 .,00 $17 .50 
4 .000 $18.00 
4 .000 $12.00 
3 .850 $17 .00 
3 .000 $16.00 
7.000 S21 .00 




2.000 $21 .00 
1.750 S24 .00 
0 .650 $16.00 
1.293 $19.00 
1.188 $12.50 
0 .900 S13.00 
1,500 $37 .75 
1200 $18 .00 
1.000 $8.25 
0 .700 $7 .50 
1 000 $11 .75 
2 .260 $19.50 
0 .714 $7 .00 
1.300 S23.00 
0 ,775 $5.50 
0 .950 S17.00 
0 .950 $10.00 
0 .350 $9.00 
1.700 $9.00 
0 .900 $7.00 
0 .900 $ 16.00 
0 .770 $15.00 
1.880 $18.00 
4 .000 $13.00 
0 .800 S7 .00 
1.402 $16 .00 
1.000 $12 .00 
1.300 $17 .00 
2 .000 $ 15 .50 
1.150 $23 .00 
4 000 S22.00 
(6) (7) (OJ (9) 
Decline in 
Market 
Market Market Cai Cap. IIS ol 
Cap. al P1iceat 1113/30/84 3/30/84 
[PQtSmil.l 3/ 30/84 ISmV 'SmV 
$110,000 $5.125 $25.825 $84.375 
$78,750 $0.875 $3.938 $74.813 
S72.000 SJ.750 S15.000 $57 .000 
$48.000 $1 ,875 $7,500 s,rn.500 
S65.450 S8.750 $33 .688 $31 .763 
$48.000 $6 .250 $18.750 $29 .250 
$ 1-47,000 $17.000 $119.000 $28.000 
$112.500 $13.750 $85.938 $28.5453 
$33.000 $3.625 $9.969 $23 .031 
$40. 171 S9.375 $22.153 $18.018 
S32.500 $15.500 $19.375 $13 ,125 
S-42.000 S14,750 $29 .500 $12.500 
$42,000 $17,125 $29.969 $12 .031 
SI0.400 S3.375 $2.194 sa.zoe 
$24,567 $12.750 $16.488 $8 .081 
$14 .854 S7.000 U .J18 S8 .5Je 
$11.700 $6.000 $5.400 $15 .300 
$S6,625 $34.000 $51.000 $5.825 
$21 .600 $13.500 $16.200 $5.400 
$8.250 $0.875 $0.875 $5 .37.5 
S5.250 $1 .000 S0.700 $4 . .550 
$11 ,750 $7.750 $7.750 $4 .000 
$4'.070 $17.750 $40.115 $3 .955 
$4 .998 $1 .750 $1.250 $3 .749 
$29,900 $20.250 $28.325 $3.575 
$4.263 $2.250 $1.744 $2.519 
$16.150 $ 15.875 $15.081 $1 .069 
$9.500 $9.250 $8.788 $0.713 
SJ . ISO $8,125 S2.844 $0.306 
$15 .300 $8 ,875 $15.088 S0.212 
$6.300 $7,500 $6.750 ('$0.450 
S14 .400 $17 .250 S15.525 ($1 .125 
$11 .550 $17 .000 $13 .090 ($1 .540 
$30.080 $17 .000 $31 .960 ($1 .880 
S52.000 $13.500 $54 .000 ($2.000 
$5.600 $10.500 $8.400 ($2.800 
$22.424 $18.500 $25 .928 ($3.504 
$12.000 $16.500 $16.500 ($4.500 
$22.100 $22.000 $28 .600 ($6.500 
$31 .000 $24 .250 $48 .500 {S17.500 
S26.450 $49.000 $58.350 (S29.900 





















53 .8% No 
"" No 2.s.o ,r. No 
88 .0% No 
86,7" No 
34.o,i, No 
9 ,o,r. No 
75.0% No 
12.0,r. No 
59. 1"4 No 
6 .8% No 
7.5"4 No 
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1.4% No 
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2. Settlements As a Percentage of Market Losses 
Professor Alexander's Table 4 is the heart of her statistical study. It 
purports to show that six of the eight cases settled for amounts near 25 
percent of the decline in market capitalization. Professor Alexander then 
attempts to explain the results for the two cases which do not fit her 
hypothesis, WICAT and Eagle Computers. 110 
Our Table 4-Al (following page) provides the corrected and unadjust-
ed settlement data for the eleven lawsuits arising from computer-related 
IPOs during the first half of 1983.111 Eight of the eleven cases appear 
in Professor Alexander's Table 4. 
The results in Table 4-Al are startlingly different from Professor 
Alexander's. They show that the eleven settlements varied from a high 
of nearly 70 percent of gross market loss to a low of 2 percent. Only 
five of the eleven settlements fell in the 20-30 percent range. 
Table 4-A2 (following Table 4-AI) analyzes the same data but adjusts 
the "stakes" using the Hambrecht and Quist Technology Index to account 
for price variation due to general market forces. 112 Now the settlement 
figures vary from a high of nearly 80 percent to a low of slightly less 
than 3 percent. Only three of eleven cases fall in the 20-30 percent 
range. The fact that 45 percent of the unadjusted sample and only 27 
percent of the adjusted sample falls within that range does not support 
I 10. Alexander, supra note 5, at 517. 
111. The settlement amount in TeleVideo was missing from Alexander's chart but 
is included here. Automatix is the one venture capital-backed !PO lawsuit missing from 
Alexander's data. See supra note 67. Both Cook Data Services and Avant-Garde 
Computing were non-venture capital-backed IPOs which appear in our Tables IA and 
2-A2. 




Table 4-A1 : Computer-Related IPO Cases 
Recoveries as a Percentage of Market Capltalization - -
Unadjusted Losses (Excluding Oiasonk:s but including Automatix, Cook, and Avant - Garde} 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Unadjustec IPO 
Price Day Market 
After Last Cap. 
luue Last Day of Shares Issue Dayal ($mil .) 
Issuer Dale Class Pd. lmH.I Price Class 141*151 
Cook Data Ser,ices 01-Fllb - 83 0t-Jul-83 0.650 $16.000 $10.500 $10.40 
Avant-Garde 30-Jun-83 29-Jul-85 t.880 $16.000 $9.000 $30.08 
Victor Technologies 23-Mar-83 16-Aug-83 4.500 $17.500 $7.750 $78.75 
MASSTOR Systems 25-Mar-83 01-Apr-84 3.000 $16.000 $6.250 $48.00 
Activision 09-Jun - 83 16-Sep-83 4.000 $12.000 $7.250 $48.00 
Fortune Systems 04-Mar-83 03-Jun-83 5.000 $22.000 $12.250 $110.00 
Priam 02-Jun-83 13-Feb-84 3.850 $17.000 $9.250 $65.45 
Wocat Systems 30-Jun-83 19-Sep-83 4.000 $18.000 $6.500 $72.00 
Eagle Computer 15-Jun-83 24-Mar-84 2.750 $12.000 $3.875 $33.00 
Automatlx 01-Mar-83 13-Mar-84 1.293 $19.000 $13.000 $24.57 
Televideo Systems 15-Mar-83 23- Jul-84 6.250 $18.000 $4.000 $112.50 
Number of cases = 11 
(8) (9) 
Marko! Ca1 . 
Day After Unadjustec 







































































Tab69 4A-2: Compuw-Ralat.d IPO ca... 
AllawwlM as• ~ci.nlllge of Meric:et c.p!Wmtlon - -
Adjustlld t..... (ExdJding Ok1aonics but lndudng Aulometbt, Codi:, and Awnt- Gsde) 
(1/ r<1 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Uredjullo< 
Prlc.Oey ---- H&OTach. lndex--- -,,.. ..... Doy-..... ..... Ooyol -- ..... Ooyol ..... Las10oy -- °"'" CION Pd. (ml.) ""'· 0- Coto o!Cluo m,,.. "'""" 02-.U,-83 t3 - Fe0-&4 3 .850 $17.000 $9.250 889.43 555.81 1.600 CodtOnl~ Ot-Feb-83 01 -.lll-83 0.650 $16.000 $10.500 n◄.98 099.04 0.800 - 01-Mlr-83 tS- Mlr-&4 1.293 $19.000 $13.000 780.n 554.02 1.409 MASSTOR- 25 - Mlr-83 01-Ap'-94 3.000 $16.000 $5.250 7"2.n 547.94 , .• 28 \llcvT- 23-Mlr-83 18- Aug-83 4.500 $17.500 17.750 785.07 778.96 1.010 _, OSl-..b,-83 te-Sep-83 4.000 $12.000 $7.250 871 .0SI 790.01 1.103 
Fonn,- 04-Mar-83 03 - .l.n-83 5.000 $22 ,000 $12.250 ...... 911 .24 0 .9<1 -- 30-....,-83 19-Sep-83 4.000 $18.000 $6.500 911 .83 797.74 1.143 &glo~ 15-.bl-83 24 - Mar - &4 2.750 $12.000 $,3.875 915.11 547.72 1.672 T-- 15-Mar-83 23- ..U-&4 6 .250 '11.000 S<.000 762.24 450.13 1.693 A'tWt-Gsde 30-.u"l-83 29-..U e5 ,.,,.., $16.00 $9.000 911.83 503.93 1.109 
Numbsaft:UN • 11 
(10) (11) (12) '"'' (14) , .. , Adju&tod IPO ... ,1.,,i"" 
OeyAfw ...... Doy- Adju&tod 
Las10.y" c.p, l.as10oyo - --~--a. .. Pra ~ ~ n~l21 ...... 'ii.iii;;;'" 111\'(9) ...... l 
$14.902 565.45 $56.99 18.481 $6.75 79,77'11, 
18.467 110.40 SS.50 , ..... $2.50 51 ,015"1(. 
$18,319 '24.57 S23.D S0.800 so ... 38.541' 
$8.929 "8.00 li29.71 $21.211 $6.00 37.71" 
$7.831 $78.75 $35.24 $43.511 $13.00 29.-
$7.994 "8.00 $31.N $18,024 S<.75 29.54 ... 
$1Ut5 $1 10.00 $56.01 '51.123 $12.00 23.tt'I, 
$7.430 $72.00 m .n "2.212 $6.25 14.7ft.. 
$8.479 133.00 $17.82 $15.182 Sl .15 12.~ 
SS.774 1112.50 $42.33 170.181 St .eo '·""" $11.295 S30.0I S30.12 .... ~ .. "·'° N/A Av.age • 32.~ 
$id. Ow.• 21.~ 
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Professor Alexander's hypothesis, particularly given the small sample 
and poor selection technique. 
It must also be recognized that 20-30 percent is a broad range, as the 
realistic settlement range for most such cases does not run from O to I 00 
percent of maximum damages. First, maximum damages are often 
understood by both sides to be unattainable, because of defenses, 
collectability problems, or for other reasons, and the maximum realistic 
recovery is often 50 to 75 percent of the mathematical "exposure." 
Second, because settlements are compromises, sophisticated defendants, 
often well-heeled, do not capitulate and pay 90 to 100 percent of even 
the realistic exposure. 113 The time value of money, the possibility of 
a favorable jury verdict even on "bad" facts, lawyer and/or client pride, 
and other factors, cause defendants to go to trial rather than settle at top 
dollar. Similar factors cause plaintiffs to accept less than top dollar 
rather than face the risks and delays of trial. Thus, even the strongest 
case may settle for 75 percent of realistic exposure, and that exposure 
may be only 60 percent of unadjusted damages, meaning that a 
handsome settlement might compute to a mere 45 percent on Professor 
Alexander's terms. 
Thus, it should not be surprising that the bulk of settlements range 
between 5 and 50 percent of Professor Alexander's "stakes," and that 
many settle between 20 and 30 percent. It appears that the Alexander 
Study merely shows something akin to a standard bell-shaped statistical 
distribution ranging from O to 50 percent of "stakes," an entirely 
predictable result. 
B. The Study Using Expanded Data 
To this point, we have critiqued Professor Alexander's methodology 
and have pointed out reasons why her study is unconvincing even on the 
small level upon which it was designed and performed. We have gone 
further, however, and tested her results on a somewhat larger scale by 
studying all high-technology IPOs during 1983. 
113. See, e.g., McDennott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1467 (1994) ("The 
settlement figure is likely to be significantly less than the settling defendant's equitable 
share of the loss."); Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 499, 
698 P.2d 159,166,213 Cal. Rptr. 256,263 (1985) (California's procedure for approving 
good faith settlements "recogni[ zes] that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he 
would if he were to be found liable after a trial."). 
993 
We began by identifying the 686 IPOs which occurred in 1983, as 
reported by the Investment Dealer s Digest electronic database, a 
comprehensive source of public offering information. 114 In the high-
technology field alone, we found ninety-three IPOs from the first-half of 
1983115 and 130 IPOs from the second-half 16 for a total initial pool 
of 223 companies. 117 In this group we found a total of nineteen 
companies which were sued on the basis of the offering. This methodol-
ogy broadens the grouping used by Professor Alexander, but does not 
completely discard her concept of homogeneity, or her basic uni-
verse--IPOs in a high-risk period for companies in high-risk industries. 
We recognize that this methodology retains several of the deficiencies 
we identified in the Alexander Study, albeit to a lesser extent. The 
sample of settlements, while more than twice the size of the Alexander 
Study sample, is still too small to draw conclusions about securities class 
action suits generally. Similarly, although expanded to include non-
computer IPOs in a wider time frame, the sample is still limited in type 
(high-technology IPOs) and time (1983), making it difficult to generalize 
about all securities class actions. We accept these deficiencies because 
our purpose is not to prove any particular proposition, but rather to test 
whether, when her sample is expanded, Professor Alexander's statistical 
conclusions survive. 







industry of the issuer; 
offering date; 
number of shares offered; 
114. Search of Effective New Issues (Public) Database, !DD Infonnation Services, 
New York, N.Y. Search of LEXIS, Cmpny library, !DD file (July 15, 1996). 
115. See infra app. B. 
I I 6. See infra app. C. 
117. We defined high technology as: 
I. Computers, including hardware, software, systems, and infonnation processing; 
2. Biomedical and biotechnology companies, including medical equipment and 
instrumentation and phannaceutical; 
3. Communications and fiber optics, including equipment, components, transmission, 
and service; and 
4. Electronics. 
We determined the primary business of the companies by examining the data in the 
Investment Dealer's Digest on-line database and the data contained in the issuer's Form 
I 0-K filings. Excluded from our expanded study were: home builders, manufacturers 
and suppliers of building supplies, airlines and aircraft, publishing equipment, delivery 
services, wholesalers and retailers (except for retailers of computer products), financial 
institutions, health care providers, rental car companies, food and clothing companies, 
consulting services, and wheelchair lift producers. 
994 
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(e) IPO issue price;118 
(f) market capitalization at offering; 119 
(g) stock price as of March 30, 1984 (for first-half IPOs) or 
September 30, 1984 ( for second-half IPOs ), as reported in 
the Daily Stock Price Record. 120 
(h) market capitalization as of March 30 or September 30, 
1984; 121 
(i) decline in market capitalization between the initial offering 
and March 30 or September 30, 1984;122 and 
(j) whether or not a suit was later filed in connection with the 
IPO.123 
By studying this expanded data set we made the following observa-
tions, all of which are inconsistent with Professor Alexander's conclu-
sions: 
1. It is not unusual for IPOs to suffer a significant decline in stock 
price and nevertheless not generate a suit; 
2. it is not unusual for IPOs to suffer a small decline but generate 
a lawsuit; and 
3. most significantly, securities class actions which settle are not 
resolved at a consistent rate near 25 percent, but rather at levels 
which vary widely. 
In sum, each of the phenomena purportedly revealed by the 
Alexander Study is inconsistent with the results from a broader sample. 
118. Note that this price is not the price at which the first market trade takes place, 
but is rather the offering price. 
119. This is the !PO price multiplied by the number of shares offered. This 
calculation corresponds with the "Offering Size in Millions of Dollars" column in Table 
1 of the Alexander Study. 
120. This corresponds with the March 30, 1984 price column in Table 1 of the 
Alexander Study. 
121. The price per share as of March 30, 1984 or September 30, 1984, multiplied 
by the number of shares offered. 
122. Corresponding to the Alexander Study' s Table 2 "Market Loss" column. 
123. Searches encompassed Daily Stock Price Record sheets, the Wall Street Journal 
Index, and Dow Jones on-line database. These searches were conducted to ascertain the 
status of these companies in order to complete the empirical investigation. Based on 
status, Form IO-K's were reviewed as appropriate. For those companies that did not 
have Form JO-K's for the entire period, due to a name change, mergers, acquisitions, 
bankruptcy, or delisting, that otherwise disappeared, an exhaustive search was conducted 
through other means. 
995 
1. Incidence of Suits 
The ninety-three first half 1983 high-tech IPOs are listed in Appendix 
B of this Article. Similar information for the one hundred thirty IPOs 
in the second-half of 1983 is collected in Appendix C of this Article. 
The companies are listed in descending order based on decline in market 
capitalization. Of the sixteen companies in Appendix B with market 
losses greater than $20 million, almost half (seven) were not sued. In 
addition, six companies with market losses of less than $20 million were 
sued. The second half of 1983 (Appendix C) brought more IPOs but 
fewer suits. Of the seven companies with market losses of more than 
$20 million, only two were sued. Furthermore, of the companies with 
market losses of less than $20 million, the same number, two, were sued. 
Combining the figures for the entire year, we find that of the twenty-
three companies with market losses greater than $20 million, less than 
half (eleven) were subject to suit, while of the two hundred companies 
with market losses less than $20 million, eight were sued. 
2. Settlements as a Percentage of Market Losses 
Tables 4-B 1 and 4-B2 (following pages) in this Article present the 
settlement data for the nineteen IPOs that resulted in lawsuits during 
1983. Of those nineteen cases, one, ATV, went to trial after a partial 
settlement and two, Margaux Controls and Clinical Data, were 
voluntarily dismissed without any payment to the class.124 Including 
the partial settlement in ATV, Table 4-B 1 shows the nineteen settlements 
as a percentage of the unadjusted losses, the methodology Professor 
Alexander used in her article. The average (mean) value for the 
settlements is 20.68 percent. Yet, the settlement percentages vary greatly 
from a high of nearly 70 percent to a low of O percent in the case of 
Clinical Data and Margaux Controls. Chart 1 (following Table 4-BJ), 
depicts this table graphically. Only six of the cases (or approximately 35 
124. See Menge v. Margaux Controls, Inc., No. C-863-485 (N.D. Cal.). In Clinical 
Data, which was never certified as a class action, the negotiated dismissal included a 
$3,500 payment of expenses to the named plaintiff. See Motion for Approval of 
Settlement of Class Suit at 2, Ackerman v. Clinical Data, Inc., No. 85-3061-S (D. Mass. 





Table 4 - B1: Expanded Study - - All 1983 "High Tech" IP Os 
Recoveries as a Percentage of Market Capitalization - -
Unadjusted Losses 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Issue Last Day of Shares 
Issuer Date Class Pd. !mil.\ 
Cook E>ata Services 01-Feb-83 01-Jul-83 0.650 
ATV Systems 18-Oct-83 15-Feb-84 0.600 
Kaypro 25-Aug-93 13-Dec-84 4.000 
Avant-Garde 30-Jun-83 29-Jul-85 1.880 
Victor Technologies 23-Mar-83 16-Aug-83 4.500 
MASSTOR Systems 25-Mar-83 01-Apr-84 3.000 
Oiasonics 23-Feb-83 31-Jan-84 5.588 
Activision 09-Jun-83 16-Sep-83 4.000 
Fortune Systems 04-Mar-83 03-Jun-83 5.000 
Priam 02-Jun-83 13-Feb-84 3.850 
Trilogy 09-Nov-83 14-Aug-84 5.000 
Wical Systems 30-Jun-83 19-Sep-83 4.000 
Eagle Computer 15-Jun-83 24-Mar-84 2.750 
Gambro (ADA) 08-Jun-83 18-Jun-84 1.100 
Automatix 01-Mar-83 13-Mar-84 1.293 
Televideo Systems 15-Mar-83 23-Jul - 84 6.250 
Satelco 12-Jul-83 22-May-84 1.820 
Margaux Controls 24-Jun-83 30-Aug-83 1.500 
Clinical Data 27-Acr-83 22-Mav-84 1.000 

















































(7) (8) (9) 
IPO Market Ca1 . 
Market Day After Unadjustec 
Cap. Last Day o Loss 
($ii.) Class($mll) ($mil.) 
141•151 /4l•t6l 171-(8} 
$10.40 $6.83 $3.575 
$6.00 $1 .95 $4.050 
$40.00 $11 .50 $28.500 
$30.08 $16.92 $13.160 
$78.75 $34.88 $43.875 
$48.00 $18.75 $29.250 
$122.94 $30.04 $92.901 
$48.00 $29.00 $19.000 
$110.00 $61 .25 $48.750 
$65.45 $35.61 $29.838 
$60.00 $6.88 $53.125 
$72 .00 $26.00 $46.000 
$33.00 $10.66 $22.344 
$49.50 $23.65 $25.850 
$24.57 $16.81 $7.758 
$112.50 $25.00 $87.500 
$21.84 $4.32 $17.518 
$24.75 $20.25 $4.500 
$6.00 $1.63 $4.375 
(10) (11) 















$1 .95 8.73% 
$1.75 6.77% 
$0.34 4 .38% 




Average = 20.68% 



























Chart 1: Distribution of Settlement Percentages 
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Tebl• -4 - 82: Expe.nded S1udy -- All 1983 "High T11eh" IPOs 
Aec:c,y-, ...... ~ge of Mart<tit Capllallzetlon - -
Ad;u,,,d looMs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
- Lu10oy of --,_ Dato CluaPd. fml .l "'""" 0'2-Jun-83 13-Feb-84 3.850 ATV- 18-0ct-83 15-F-eb-lM 0.600 
C<dtOa\ls-w:a Ot-F.t,-83 OI-Jul-83 0.650 
Kaypo 25-Aug-93 13-0ec-84 4.000 - 01 - Mlw-83 13-Mlf-M 1.293 MASSTOR- 25-t.w- 83 Ot-Ap'-84 3.000 ""'°'r--....,,,- 23-Mat-83 18-""9-83 4.500 -· 23-F«>-83 31-Jan-&4 5.5811 Al:1Mllon 09-M-113 18-S.,,-83 4,000 -- 04-Mar-13 03-Jun-83 5.000 Gemtwo<A[)R) oe-Jun-93 11-.U,-84 1.100 Trlogy 09-Nov-83 14-Aug- lM 5.000 
WicetSyslllma 30-Jun-83 19-Sep-83 4.000 ..,,,.eom,... 15-Jun-13 2◄-Mar-84 2.750 
r.i.wteo~ 15-Mar-83 23-Jul-&4 6.250 ....... l2-Jul-83 22-Moy-84 1.820 
Clnic:.10.ta 27-Ap,-83 22-Moy-84 1.000 
MargaUkConl'ofs 24-Jun-83 30-Aug-83 1.500 
~-..nc-G.de 30-Jun- 83 29-Jul-as 1.IIOO 






















Nolli: lheSl .95mlnlonATVNtllMWYtlaudUIN9ofarnountwon•t•Lal. 
(6) ,,, (8) (9) 
Unodju,'°' 
Pl-letlOey ---- H&OT.aeh. lnde-- ---- OoyA.., O.yof ,_ Lastllay RabO: Class Dalo ofClua m/fBl 
••= ..... 555.81 1.000 $3250 691.46 552.2& 1.252 
$10.500 724,98 099.04 0806 
$2.875 74090 470,78 1,574 
$13.000 1eo.n 554.02 1.409 
$6.250 1&2.n 547.94 1.428 
$7,750 785.07 n&.98 1.010 
$5.375 782.75 602.35 1.299 
$1250 971 ,09 790,01 1.103 
$12.250 1164.IM 911.24 0.048 
$21.500 969.22 507.91 1.711 
$1.375 665.75 550,17 1.210 
$6.500 911.83 797.74 1.143 
'3.175 915.81 547.72 1.1572 
$<0.000 762.24 450.13 1.693 
$2.375 891.40 558.24 1597 
$1.625 1100 .... 517.97 1.546 
$13.500 940,21 749,48 1254 
$9.000 911.83 503.90 1.IIOO 
(10} ,,,, ...J::lc.i (10) ... _ IPO 
OoyAtw ...... 0.yAtw Ad)u,lod 
LastOoyo c.,,. Lu1Doyo ...... 
ClauPrie11 l!;:"'4 c::;:,~ 11~l2l f6)•(9l 
$14.802 565.45 ...... $8.461 
$<0 .069 $8.00 $2.44 $3.559 
$8.467 $10.40 $5.50 $4.890 
$4.525 S-00.00 s1a.10 $21.900 
$18.319 $24.57 $23.69 SO.IIOO 
$8.928 $48.00 $28.78 1,21.2111 
S7.831 $7875 $3524 s,43.511 
$6.985 $122.94 $39.03 $83.905 
'7,994 $48.00 $31.99 $10:.0'24 
$11 .615 $110,00 556.011 $51 .923 
$36.794 $49,50 $40.◄7 $9,020 
$1.864 $60.00 $8.32 $51.581 
$7.430 $72.00 $29.72 S.C2.282 
$6,479 $33.00 $17.82 $15,182 
S6.n4 $112.!50 $42.33 170.166 
$3.792 $21 .84 $6.90 $14.938 
$2.512 se.oo $2.51 $3.4M 
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0 Chart 2: Distribution of Settlement Percentages 
Taken From Table 4-B2 (Adjusted Losses) 
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percent) settled in the 20-30 percent range. 125 Even if the dismissals 
without payment are excluded, five of the cases settled for less than 10 
percent of the unadjusted market loss. 
Table 4-B2 presents the same data with the market loss figures 
adjusted using the Hambrecht and Quist Technology Jndex. 126 Typical-
ly the settlement percentages improve, reflecting the declining perfor-
mance of high-tech stocks generally during this period. 127 The average 
(mean) value for the settlements is 27.03 percent.128 Again, however, 
the settlement percentages vary considerably from a high of almost 80 
percent to a low of0 percent. See Table 4-B2 on following page. Chart 
2 (preceding page), displays this variation graphically. 
V. A REEXAMINATION OF THE ALEXANDER STUDY'S CONCLUSIONS 
IN LIGHT OF THE CORRECTED AND EXPANDED DATA 
From the Alexander Study as originally published, one gets a portrait 
of a segment of the litigation system out of kilter. Virtually every case 
settles for approximately 25 percent of the "stakes" in the lawsuit 
without regard to merit. Under these circumstances, "the mere filing of 
a complaint appears to be a ticket to a guaranteed and substantial 
recovery."129 Because good cases settle for no more than frivolous 
ones, the strength of a case does not determine whether an action is 
125. The standard deviation of the sample is 18.20 percent. Standard deviation is 
a statistical concept which describes the variation in a sample which has a normal 
(symmetrical bell-shaped) distribution. By definition, 68.3% of the observed values in 
the sample will be within one standard deviation of the mean. See, e.g., SUMMERS, 
supra note 28, at 73-74. Where the standard deviation is small, the curve is tall and thin 
with the values clustered closely about the mean. Where the standard deviation is large, 
the curve is flat and the values are spread significantly. Here, a standard deviation of 
18.20% from a mean of 20.68% indicates that based on this sample, one would expect 
that approximately 68% of the cases would settle for between 2.48% and 38.88% of the 
unadjusted market loss. Because this standard deviation is relatively large, the settlement 
percentages vary considerably and the mean is not an accurate predictor of the settlement 
percentage in any given case. 
126. See supra notes IO 1-102 and accompanying text. 
127. All the foundational data for Margaux Controls and Avant-Garde Computing 
are provided but no settlement percentage figures are included because those cases had 
no adjusted loss. This may help explain the voluntary dismissal in Margaux Controls. 
The $4.2 million settlement in Avant-Garde Computing looks both curious and extremely 
beneficial to the class. 
128. The standard deviation of the sample using adjusted damage figures is 21.69%, 
which is even larger than that of the unadjusted sample. See supra note 126. 
129. Alexander, supra note 5, at 569. 
1001 
filed. Rather, the determining factor is whether the "stakes" are high 
enough to generate a settlement of sufficient magnitude to justify a 
substantial attorney's fee award. Thus, one could expect that a suit 
would be filed whenever a drop in stock price generates a market loss 
of more than $20 million. In such circumstances, Professor Alexander 
suggests, shareholder class action suits have become a partial insurance 
system against substantial market losses-accompanied by high transac-
tion costs-rather than protection for shareholders against fraud or other 
corporate misconduct.130 Indeed, these are the charges which spurred 
congressional scrutiny and action. 131 
Because the data we have collected contrast with the results presented 
by Professor Alexander, we will now reexamine Professor Alexander's 
conclusions in light of the corrected and expanded data. 
A. Incidence of Suits 
Professor Alexander's sample purports to show that large declines in 
market capitalization (over $20 million) inevitably result in securities 
class action suits, while smaller declines (under $20 million) never result 
in suits. A chink in Professor Alexander's statistical armor first 
appeared when the data was expanded to include five computer-related 
venture capital-backed IPOs that were missed in the Alexander Study. 
One IPO with a market loss less than $20 million was sued and one with 
a market loss greater than $20 million was not sued. 132 Two more 
IPOs inconsistent with Professor Alexander's $20 million threshold were 
identified when the sample was expanded to include the twenty-one non-
venture capital-backed computer-related offerings during the first half of 
1983.133 
The chink is confirmed and Professor Alexander's hypothesis 
disintegrates with the expanded sample of all 1983 high-tech IPOs. 
Fewer than half of the twenty-three companies with market losses greater 
than $20 million were sued while eight with market losses of less than 
$20 million were sued. 
To be sure, even our expanded data set of 223 IPOs shows a 
correlation between the extent of market loss and the filing of a lawsuit. 
But this is not surprising for two reasons. First, the contingent fee 
system, whether in the securities class action context or in other types 
of cases, such as personal injury and business torts, is designed to give 
130. See id. at 570. 
13 l. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
132. See supra text accompanying tbl. 2-Al. 
133. See supra text accompanying tbl. 2-A2. 
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lawyers greater economic incentive in cases with more serious damages 
and greater potential recovery. 134 If Professor Alexander has simply 
demonstrated that large cases draw more interest from plaintiffs' lawyers 
than small ones, that is surely no surprise. Second, a precipitous decline 
in the price of a stock which follows negative corporate disclosures 
suggests that investors were surprised by the disclosures, and the market 
is likely to be particularly surprised when it has been misled by 
management's prior statements about the company or its failure to 
disclose material information. 
Quite clearly then, Professor Alexander's $20 million "magic" line 
simply does not exist. 135 This conclusion, in tum, undermines another 
of her hypotheses. If all securities class actions settled for a set 
percentage of the "stakes" without regard to merit, why is it that over 
half of the companies exhibiting a market loss of more than $20 million 
are not sued? If even meritorious cases never recover more than 25 
percent of the "stakes," why is it that a significant number of companies 
with market losses of less than $10 million are sued? A likely 
explanation is that the "merits" of the case do matter. 
B. Incidence of Settlements 
All nine lawsuits in Professor Alexander's sample were settled. From 
this and other data she infers that "securities class actions are adjudicated 
considerably less often than other types of cases."136 Later in the 
article she posits how the unavailability of trial or other adjudicatory 
resolution helps to explain her principal thesis: The cases settle without 
regard to merit. 
In our expanded sample of nineteen cases, one, ATV, went to trial. 
However, the fact that only one out of nineteen cases (5.3 percent) was 
tried can hardly be considered surprising. Citing statistics from the 
134. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 524-25 (3d 
ed. 1986). 
I 35. As we would have predicted, the correlation is incremental, increasing 
gradually with the size of the market loss. For instance, of the 7 companies which 
suffered a loss greater than $50 million, 6 (or 86%) were sued. Of the 16 companies 
suffering a loss between $20 million and $40 million, 5 (or 31%) were sued. Of the 22 
companies with losses between $10 million and $20 million, 3 (or 14%) were sued. 
Finally, of the 118 companies suffering losses less than $10 million, only 4 (or 3%) were 
sued. 
136. Alexander, supra note 5, at 526. 
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Administrative Office of the Courts, the Supreme Court recently noted 
that "[!Jess than five percent of cases filed in federal court end in 
trial."137 Also, the two statistical studies cited by Professor Alexan-
der-which show trials in 2 and 6 percent of the cases studied-do not 
deviate substantially from the "less than five percent" ballpark figure 
referred to by the Supreme Court. 138 Thus, trial is no less frequent 
here than in other areas of civil litigation, and any congressional sense 
that a high incident of settlements indicated a need for reform appears 
misplaced. 
Perhaps more critical is Professor Alexander's assertion that securities 
class actions are not adjudicated pretrial by means of motions to dismiss, 
motions for summary judgment, and the like. Professor Alexander cites 
two studies estimating, respectively, that 35 and 22.5 percent of cases in 
federal court are adjudicated by motion without trial.139 Another 
source mentioned by Professor Alexander, and cited recently by the 
Supreme Court, indicates that only 15 percent of federal cases are 
adjudicated pretrial. 140 
Although Professor Alexander's data (and our expanded study) show 
no cases adjudicated pretrial, broader and subsequent studies indicate 
that a 1983 high-tech sample is simply too small and homogeneous to 
be representative. Figures from one recent broad study indicate that 
nearly 20 percent of securities class action cases between 1991 and 1996 
were resolved by judgment or dismissal rather than settlement.141 
Another study by a defense law firm which specializes in defending 
high-tech corporate clients found that 30 percent of the securities cases 
resolved in 1992 were involuntarily dismissed by the court. 142 Two 
137. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202,212 n.22 (1994). 
138. Alexander, supra note 5, at 526. A recent study by the Federal Judicial Center 
reaches a consistent conclusion. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of 
Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules ( l 996) ("The trial rates in class actions in each of the four districts was 
not notably different from the 3% to 6% trial rate for nonprisoner nonclass civil actions 
.... "). 
139. Alexander, supra note 5, at 524-25. 
140. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 
JUDICATURE 161, 163-64 (1986), cited in McDermott, Inc., 511 U.S. at 212 n.22; see 
also Alexander, supra note 5, at 525 n.94. 
141. DENISE N. MARTIN ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IV: WHAT EXPLAINS FILINGS AND 
SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS? Table 5 (1996). 
142. Lawrence Aragon, Know Thy Enemy, PC WEEK, Sept. 13, 1993, at Al. Bruce 
Vanyo, a prominent member of the same defense firm which conducted the study, has 
been quoted as saying that "a majority of recent reported projections/forecasts cases have 
been disposed of at the pleading stage." Marino & Marino, supra note I 2, at l 58 
( emphasis added). 
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defense attorneys recently wrote that "[fJederal courts have displayed a 
striking willingness to dismiss" shareholder class action lawsuits. 143 
In sum, Professor Alexander's contention that "securities class actions 
are adjudicated considerably less often than other types of cases"144 
appears to be inaccurate. At best, she captured a temporary phenomenon 
in an exceedingly narrow market segment. 145 
C. Settlements as a Percentage of Gross Losses 
When we reperformed the Alexander Study in a consistent and 
rigorous fashion with necessary corrections and adjustments, we found 
a pattern of settlements in eleven cases which varied to a considerably 
greater extent than the data presented by Professor Alexander. 146 In 
our expanded study of nineteen suits resulting from high-tech IPOs 
during all of 1983, the settlement percentages showed even more 
variation. 147 The variation is so substantial that no conclusions can be 
drawn about a value around which settlements tend to cluster. 
Statistical analysis confirms the extent of variation. The standard 
deviation of the original Alexander Study (Table 4) was 6.83 percent on 
a sample mean of 21.67 percent. This relatively small deviation was 
consistent with the claim that settlement values clustered about the 25 
percent figure. 148 However, using the corrected data found in our 
Tables 4-Al and 4-A2 (eleven and ten cases), the standard deviation 
increased markedly to 18.51 percent and 21.96 percent, respectively. 
These figures are confirmed using the expanded data in Tables 4-B l and 
4-B2 (nineteen and eighteen cases), when the standard deviation is 
143. Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufinanis, Directors' Liability: No Fraud By 
Hindsight, 14 CORP. BOARD 7, 8 (1993) (emphasis added). 
144. Alexander, supra note 5, at 526 (emphasis added). 
145. More recently, Professor Alexander appears to give conflicting signals on this 
point. In her most current article, she acknowledges that, "[r]ecently, courts have been 
somewhat more willing to grant motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, but such 
dispositions are still the exception .... " Alexander, The Value of Bad News, supra note 
17, at 1435. She fails to acknowledge that adjudication is the exception in virtually 
every type of case. Moreover, in the text of her article she continues to assert that 
because securities class actions are rarely dismissed, "[ o ]nee the suit is filed, substantial 
economic consequences are virtually certain." Id. at 1435 (emphasis added). 
I 46. See supra text accompanying this. 4-A I, 4-A2. 
147. See supra text accompanying this. 4-Bl, 4-B2, charts I, 2. 
148. See supra note 126 for a simple explanation of the meaning of standard 
deviation. 
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calculated at 18.20 percent and 21.69 percent, respectively. All of the 
corrected and expanded data shows substantially less clustering and more 
variation in the settlement percentages than in Professor Alexander's 
original sample of eight cases. 149 Significantly, the variation is 
greatest when the gross market loss damages are realistically adjusted. 
Using either statistical approach, however, the results are fundamentally 
inconsistent with Professor Alexander's hypothesis. 
VI. THE ALEXANDER STUDY'S CONCLUSIONS ARE INCONSISTENT 
WITH BROADER DATA CONCERNING THE INCIDENCE OF PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS AND THE INCIDENCE OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SUITS 
If Professor Alexander was correct that securities class actions 
routinely settle for 25 percent of market losses regardless of their merits 
and have, in effect, become a litigation tax on the capital markets, then 
there should be some empirical evidence of several phenomena 
suggested by Professor Alexander. We have been unable, however, to 
uncover any such support for Professor Alexander's hypotheses and 
conclusions. Indeed, the data is to the contrary. 
First, one would expect the imposition of this "litigation tax" to have 
some discernible negative impact on the capital formation process. Are 
there fewer public companies or, at least, fewer IPOs by companies 
"going public?" Are public offerings, initial or otherwise, raising less 
money? In each case, the answer to these questions is a resounding and 
unequivocal "no." 
Contrary to what would be expected if meritless securities class action 
suits were operating as a hidden tax on stock offerings, public offerings 
have increased dramatically over the last twenty years. Initial public 
offerings of stock, the exact situation Professor Alexander focused on as 
being subject to meritless claims, have soared. See Table 5 (Initial 
Public Offerings of Common Stock 1974-1993) on the following 
page. 1so 
Similarly, the number of common stock offerings generally, and the 
amount of money raised in them has grown dramatically over the last 
149. The limited empirical evidence available supports our conclusion. The 
Assistant General Counsel for the State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) recently 
reported that SWIB's recoveries from securities class action lawsuits in the past year 
"averaged about 16% of its court-certified losses. Recoveries in individual cases ranged 
from I% to I 00% of losses." Keith Johnson, Institutional Investor Participation in Class 
Actions After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in, Current Issues in 
Corporate Governance 2 (ALI-ABA 1996) (program material on file with authors). 
150. Search of Effective New Issues (Public) Database, !DD Infonnation Services, 





Table 5: Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock 
1974 - 1993 
Number of 
Year Issues Proceeds 
1974 9 $98,800,000 
1975 6 $189,400,000 
1976 40 $337,200,000 
19n 32 $221 ,600,000 
1978 38 $225,400,000 
1979 62 $398,400,000 
1980 149 $1 ,387,100,000 
1981 348 $3,114,700,000 
1982 122 $1 ,339,100,000 
1983 686 $12,466,400,000 
1984 357 $3,868,900,000 
1985 355 $8,497,600,000 
1986 726 $22,211,300,000 
1987 556 $26,847,300,000 
1988 291 $23,807,500,000 
1989 254 $13,706,100,000 
1990 213 $10, 117,400,000 
1991 402 $25, 144,200,000 
1992 603 $39,940,800,000 
1993 819 $57,439,500,000 
Percent Increase 
1974 - 1993 9000.0% 58037.1% 
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twenty years, as evidenced by Table 6 (following page). 151 
These figures appear to contradict Professor Alexander's conclusions. 
But, critics of class actions might argue, perhaps the markets might be 
even stronger if it weren't for the impact of an excessive number of 
securities suits. 
There is another way to test the thesis. If Professor Alexander is 
correct, and if the conditions supposedly leading to securities class action 
suits (for example, stock offerings, stock trading, and price volatility) are 
increasing, then securities class actions filings should also be increasing. 
After all, according to the implications of the Alexander Study, these 
suits are a virtually riskless way for lawyers to profit. Indeed, if all 
cases with substantial gross market losses settle for about 25 percent of 
those losses, lawyers should file suit in virtually all such cases. 
The statistics, however, do not validate this conclusion. Notwithstand-
ing the huge increases in stock offerings (and stock trading) over the last 
twenty years, the number of securities class action suits filed in 1993 is 
slightly less than the number filed in 1974. Moreover, this decline has 
occurred during a period when total federal court civil filings have 
increased 122 percent. See Table 7 (Securities Class Action Lawsuits 
1974-1993) following Table 6.152 When the information in Tables 5, 
6, and 7 is combined and presented graphically in Chart 3 (following 
Table 7), the lack of any significant growth in securities class action 
suits over the past twenty years is quite clear. 
Although these general market statistics are convincing, we tried to 
develop an even more direct way to test Professor Alexander's 
hypothesis that $20 million in damage "stakes" invariably generates a 
securities class action lawsuit. This proved to be a difficult task because 
there was no readily available source for determining the number of 
times a decline in stock price yielded $20 million in theoretical damages 
short of performing a company-by-company trading and market 
capitalization analysis. 
One figure we did have access to was the number of instances in 
which a stock suffered a one-day 10 percent Joss in value. We 
accordingly decided to use a modified sampling technique focusing on 
151. Id. 
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Table 7: Securities Class Action Lawsuits 
t974 - 1993 
Securities Class 
Securities Total Federal Actions As A 
Class Action Court Civil Percentage of 
Year Lawsuits Filed Cases Filed Total Federal Filings 
1974 305 103,530 0.29% 
1975 258 117,320 0.22% 
1976 212 130,597 0.16% 
19TT 176 130,567 0.13% 
1978 167 138,770 0.12% 
1979 100 154,666 0.06% 
1980 87 168,789 0.05% 
1981 86 180,576 0.05% 
1982 151 206,193 0.07% 
1983 133 241,842 0.05% 
1984 149 261,485 0.06"/4 
1985 140 273,670 0.05% 
1986 118 254,828 0.05% 
1987 108 239,185 0.05% 
1988 108 239,634 0.05% 
1989 118 233,529 0.05% 
1990 315 217,879 0.14% 
1991 299 210,890 0.14% 
1992 268 230,509 0.12% 
1993 298 229,850 0.13% 
Percent Increase 




Chart 3: Initial Public Offerings, Common Stock Offerings 
and Securities Class Action Lawsuits 
1974 - 1993 
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companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in a year, 
1991, in which the average value per issue was nearly $2 billion. 153 
This means that a 10 percent loss in value for an average NYSE 
company would result in "stakes" of almost $200 million or nearly ten 
times Professor Alexander's $20 million threshold. 
In calendar year 1991, there were a total of 434 one-day price declines 
on the NYSE which constituted a 10 percent-or-greater reduction in the 
stock's value. 154 Because a mere J percent reduction would result in 
nearly $20 million in "stakes" for the "average" NYSE company, we feel 
supremely confident there were at least 434 cases in which a price 
decline generated $20 million in potential damages under the criteria of 
the Alexander Study. 
We then turned to case filing statistics from the Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts as analyzed by one of the preeminent 
publications in the field, Securities Class Action Alert (SCAA). For the 
fiscal year ending September 30, 1992, the Administrative Office reports 
a total of 268 securities class action suits filed. 155 Because multiple 
suits are often filed when a company's stock price collapses as a result 
of fraud or other wrongdoing, SCAA determined that the 268 class action 
filings actually represented suits against only 113 different compa-
nies.156 SCAA then analyzed those 113 cases individually to ascertain 
that only 34 of the suits were filed against NYSE companies.157 Thus, 
153. The average value per issue was $1,968,427,957. NEW YORK STOCK 
EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1991, at IO (1992). We chose calendar year 
1991 because the breakdown of case filing statistics from the Administrative Office of 
the United States Court provided by Securities Class Action Alert was for the fiscal year 
ending September 30, 1992. Although many of our critics suggest that the filing of a 
lawsuit almost instantaneously follows a significant decline in the price of a stock, no 
one of whom we are aware has thus far atrributed to the plaintiffs' securities bar the pre-
science to file suits before the price decline. It was thus necessary, to assure a 
reasonable degree of correspondence, to use the stock price figures for calendar year 
1991 which overlapped but preceded the case filing statistics. 
154. Search of Daily U.S. Equity Database, Center for Research in Security Prices, 
Chicago, IL (July, 1993). 
155. 1993 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., ANN. REP. DIRECTOR Al-313. 
156. See What Litigation Explosion?, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION ALERT, July 1993, 
at 40. 
157. According to SCAA, the following NYSE companies were subject to a 
securities class action lawsuit during fiscal I 992: Medical Care, Oryx Energy, Centel, 
Ann Taylor Stores, International Recovery, Triton Energy, U.S. Surgical, Crystal Brands, 
Home Fed Corp., Jenny Craig, Nicolet Instruments, Westinghouse, Humana Inc., 
American Express Co., Commodore International Ltd., CSX Corp., lntellicall, Inc., 
Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., Sanifill Inc., Zapata Corp., El Paso Refinery, Upjohn 
Co., Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., Specialty Equipment Companies, Inc., Household 
International, Inc., Abbott Laboratories, Safety-Kleen Corp., Cypress Semiconductor 
Corp., National Media Corp., Community Psychiatric Centers, Price Co., Cal Fed Inc., 
First Financial Management Corp., and Harley-Davidson, Inc. (The breakdown of all 
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using an extraordinarily conservative estimate of 434 instances in which 
the "stakes" exceeded $20 million for NYSE companies, we still find 
that only 34 suits were filed during a comparable time period, a rate of 
less than 13 percent. 
As was the case with the results of our revised study, these raw 
numbers are compelling, but their implications for the hypotheses 
underlying Professor Alexander's article are more than significant; they 
are devastating. Professor Alexander's principal thesis is that securities 
class action lawsuits are virtually always settled at or near a set 
percentage of the theoretical damage "stakes" without regard to merit. 
If this is accurate, then it is the amount of those "stakes" which 
primarily determine whether it is economically rational for plaintiffs' 
counsel to prosecute a case. The Alexander Study finds support for its 
principal thesis by using a limited sample of cases, one in which all 
companies whose stock suffered market losses of $20 million were sued. 
The Alexander Study, therefore, concludes that $20 million appears to 
be the threshold level at which a securities class action becomes 
profitable to litigate. 
The SCAA figures, particularly when combined with the results of our 
revised study,158 demonstrate that lawsuits are not filed every time (or 
even one-fifth of the time) a stock suffers a $20 million loss. Certainly 
the plaintiffs' class action bar has rarely been accused of being a timid 
lot. Thus, although Professor Alexander's data are inaccurate, one aspect 
of her logic remains unassailable: If securities class actions were settled 
for a set percentage of the "stakes" without regard to merit, the "stakes" 
should be the principal determinant of when a lawsuit is filed, such that 
a reasonably consistent threshold is observable. If there is no consistent 
threshold, then cases must not settle at or near a set percentage. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Professor Alexander paints a portrait of both sides of the securities 
bar, plaintiffs' and defense, which although benign in tone is excoriating 
in substance. Instead of the model of lawyers in the adversary 
system-energetically representing diverse interests in a search for the 
truth and negotiating reasonable compromises based on risks and 
268 cases provided by SCAA is on file with the authors.) 
158. See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text. 
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achievable benefits-Professor Alexander suggests there are overwhelm-
ing economic and institutional pressures on both lawyers and their clients 
that produce a system in which everyone "goes along to get along." The 
result, according to Professor Alexander, is a process in which the merits 
of the cases are irrelevant; a "bad" case produces the same level of 
recovery as a "good" one. Congress appears to have accepted this 
criticism of the system as valid in enacting significant new legislation. 
Having suggested such fundamentally critical conclusions that have 
gained wide acceptance, it is unfortunate that the methodology of 
Professor Alexander's research was not more thoughtful, the perfor-
mance of her study more rigorous, and the analysis of her results more 
searching. We believe the contrary data we have presented, and the 
conclusions we suggest, are considerably more neutral, objective, and 
rigorous, and thus will materially contribute to the ongoing debate on 
this important topic. 
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APPENDIX A: ARITHMETIC AND DATA ERRORS 
The Alexander Study contains a number of clerical and arithmetic 
errors that detract from its credibility. The errors are of two types: ( 1) 
errors in the computation of declines in market capitalization as of 
March 30 1994 and (2) errors in the computation of declines in market 
capitalization as of the day following the last day of the class period. 
The second type of error, in turn, causes errors in computing the 
settlements as a percentage of "stakes." 
A. Errors in the Computation of Declines in Market Capitalization 
Table Al documents the errors in the computation of declines in 
market capitalization as of March 30, 1984. The following is a case by 
case analysis: 
1. Eagle Computers. Table 1 of the Alexander Study lists the IPO 
price per share as $23, 159 when it is in fact $12. This error 
implies an erroneous IPO market capitalization of $63.25 million 
(2.75 million shares@ $23). (Table 1 does list the offering size 
correctly as $33 million.) However, the pricing error leads to the 
computation of the decline in market capitalization of $53.280 
million ($63.25 million - $9.689 million), a figure that is listed 
in Table 2. 160 
2. Penta. Table 1 of the Alexander Study lists the IPO price per 
share as $17, 161 when it is in fact $12.50. It also lists the IPO 
market capitalization as $16. 15 million 162 when it is in fact 
$14.85 million (1.1828 million shares @ $12.5). Note that the 
$16.15 million IPO market capitalization figure implies that the 
number of shares in the IPO is 0.95 million shares ($16.15 
million/$17 per share), which is also incorrect. These errors 
would yield a IPO market capitalization as of March 30, 1984, of 
$6.650 million (0.95 million shares@ $7.00 per share). In tum, 
this leads to a computed decline in market capitalization as of 
159. Alexander, supra note 5, at 510. 
160. Id. at 512. 
161. Id. at 510. 
162. Id. 
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March 30, 1984, of $9.500 million - $6.65 million), a figure 
that is listed (incorrectly) in Table 2. 163 
3. Priam. Table 2 of the Alexander Study lists the decline in 
market capitalization as $32.76 million,164 when in fact the 
computations should have yielded $31.76 million ($65.45 million 
- $33.69 million). 
4. Primages. Table 1 of the Alexander Study lists the IPO market 
capitalization as $14.880 million, 165 when it is in fact $6.300 
million (0.900 million shares@ $7.00 per share). This $14.880 
million IPO market capitalization figure implies that the number 
of shares in the IPO is 2.126 million shares ($14.880 million/$? 
per share), which is also incorrect. This 2.126 million figure 
would imply a market capitalization as of March 30, 1984, of 
$15.945 million (2.126 million shares@ $7.50 per share). This, 
in tum, would imply a decline in market capitalization as of 
March 30, 1984 of - $1.063 million ($14.880 million -
$15.943 million). Table 2, however, does list correctly the 
decline in market capitalization as of March 30, 1984, as -
$0.45 million. 166 
5. Quality Micro Systems. Table I of the Study lists the IPO market 
capitalization as $6.300 million,167 when it is in fact $16.15 
million (0.950 million shares @ $17 .00 per share). This $6.300 
million IPO market capitalization figure implies that the number 
of shares in the IPO is 0.371 million shares ($6.300 million/$17 
per share), which is also incorrect. This 0.3 7 I million figure 
would imply a market capitalization as of March 30, 1984, of 
$5.883 million (0.371 million shares @$15.875 per share). This, 
in tum, would imply a decline in market capitalization as of 
March 30, 1984 of $0.471 million ($6.300 million - $5.883 
million). Moreover, Table 2 erroneously lists the decline in 
market capitalization as of March 30, 1984, as $1.010 mil-
lion. 168 (Note that the "IPO shares" and "IPO market capital-
ization" figures for Penta are actually the correct figures for 
Quality Micro Systems.) 
163. Id. at 512. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 510. 
166. Id. at 512. 
167. Id. at 510. 
168. Id. at 512. 
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B. Errors in the Computation of Declines in Market Capitalization 
as of the Day Following the Last Day in the Class Period 
Tables A2 and A3 document that in six of the nine lawsuits, Table 4 
of the Alexander Study lists the "class close" price incorrectly. These 
errors in turn lead to errors in the market capitalization as of the day 
following the last day in the class period, and in the computation of the 
"stakes." Finally, these errors also lead to errors in the computation of 
the settlement as a percentage of the stakes. In the case of Priam and 
Victor, the differences are in excess of two percentage points. 
For the nine IPOs resulting in suits, Table A2 shows bid/asked, or as 
appropriate, high/low/close prices for the day before, day of, and day 
following the last day of the class period. Table A3 isolates those prices 
which match the figures listed in Table 4 of the Alexander Study. 
Because of variation in the way different lawyers plead class periods, the 
bid or close price as of the day following the last day of the class period 
should be utilized to insure that the entire price effect of the alleged 
misstatement or omission is captured. Alexander's choices, however, are 
not consistent. In three of the cases (Fortune, Activision and Masstor), 
she lists the correct price. In four of the cases (Diasonics, Victor, Priam 
and TeleVideo), the low price for the day after is listed. In the Wicat 
case, Professor Alexander lists the high price on the last day of the class 
period, and in the Eagle case she lists the close price on the day before 
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Appendix B: Listing of lf>Os Examined (First Half of 1D83) • 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Issue Shares 
Issuer Bllliness Date lmil.l 
Dia.sonics Mfr medical imaging sys 23-Feb-83 5 .588 
Fottune Systems Mfr desktop computers 04-Mar-83 5 .000 
Victor Technologies Mfr microcompU1ers 23-Mar-83 4 .500 
Wical Systems Mfr microcomputer sys 30-Jun-83 4 .000 
Erbamont Mfr anti-cancer drugs 21-Jun-83 6 .200 
Actrvislon Mfr computer games 09-Jun-83 4 ,000 
Priam Mfr disk drrves 02-Jun-83 3.850 
MASSTOR Sysllms Mfr computer mass storage 25-Mar-83 3 .000 
Amgen Biological research 17-Jun-83 2.350 
LSI Logic Mfr semiconductor circuits 13-May-83 7 .000 
Televkfeo Systems Mfr video display terminals 15-Mar-83 6 .250 
Biogen Biotechnology A&O 22-Mar-83 2.500 
Huntingdon Research Centie (ADA) Bio safety evaluation devh::e 14-Jun-83 4 .000 
Damon BiOl!ch M~ blamed prods 03-Jun-83 2.400 
Eagle Compuler Mfr microcomputer sys 15-Jun-83 2.750 
Combined Network Lng dst voice & data trnsmn 20-Ap<-83 3 .700 
Smhh Laboratories Drug for ln1ervenebral disc 27-Jun-83 3.039 
Mlc,opolm Mfrdiskdriws 03-Jun-83 2.363 
Cosmo Communications Mfr electronic prods 20-May-83 1.800 
CooperVision Optholmlgy/oplomlry devia 21-J.an-83 3 ,000 
Gambro (ADA) Extracorporeal purtficatn sys oe-Jun-83 1.100 
Ungermann-Bass Mrr communctions ntwrk sys 23-Jun-83 2.682 
U. S. Telephone Long dist phone SYC 02-Feb-83 1.436 
OST Systems Dev mutual fund softwr 18-Mar-83 1.250 
Margaux Controls Mfr energy mgmnt sys 24-Jun-83 1.500 
Computer Language Research Tu Pfocesslng softwr~vc 27-May-83 2.000 
American Software Develop compU1er softwr 24-Feb-83 1.750 
Cook Data Services Dev computer sonwr ot-Feb-83 0.650 
Automatix Develop robotics/softwr 01-Mar-83 1.293 
Penta Systems International Computer typography sys 15-Mar-83 1.188 
Telerate Computer financial svcs 27-Apr-83 4.000 
Hate Systems Satelli'9/radar sys/softwr 21-Jun-83 0 .900 
202 Data SysterM Lease softwr/computers 14-Jun-83 0 .840 
BA Communk:ations Mfr communications equip 16-Mar-83 1.000 
NO<Sk Data (ADR) Mrr minlcompulers 27-May-83 1.500 
SGS Systems Develop/market software: 03 - Jun-83 1.200 
Spectra video Mkt vldeogames/eqp/softwr 11-May-83 1.000 
Teleram Communications Mfr p0ftable compU1er/eqp 26-May-83 0.700 
Clinical Data Mfr medical electronic prods 27-Apr-83 1.000 
...... 
0 ...... 
Scientific Systems SefVioes Computer softwr svc 22-Mar-83 1.000 
KeyTronic Mfr computer keyboards 22-Jun-83 2.260 
CONSCO Enterprises Dev softwr sys 11-May-83 0.714 
'-0 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Market Market Cai: 
Issue Cap. at Price at ■13/30/94 
Price IPO~m;l,l •-,a.c 1$mll.l 
$22.00 $122.936 SS.000 $27.940 
$22.00 $110.000 SS.125 $25.625 
$17,50 $78.750 S0.875 $3.-
$18.00 $72.000 $3,750 $15.000 
$18.00 $111 .600 $10.750 SM.650 
$12.00 $48.000 $1.875 $7,500 
$17,00 $65.450 $8.750 $33,888 
$16.00 $48.000 $8.250 $18.750 
$18.00 $.42.300 $8.000 $14.100 
$21.00 $147.000 $17,000 $119.000 
$18.00 $112.500 $13.750 $85.-
$23.00 $57.500 $13.000 $32.500 
$15,00 $60,000 $9.000 $38.000 
$17.00 $40.800 $7,250 $17.400 
$12.00 $33.000 $3,625 $9.969 
$11 .00 $40.700 SS.000 $18.500 
$16.50 $50.144 $10.125 $30.no 
$17.00 $40,171 $9.375 $22.153 
$22.00 $39.600 $12.000 $21.BOO 
$20.00 $60,000 S14.300 $42,900 
$45.00 $49,500 $31 .500 $34 .650 
$18.00 $48.276 $12.750 $34.196 
$14.00 $20.104 $4.375 $8,283 
$28.00 $32.500 $15.500 $19,375 
$16.50 $24.750 $7,750 $11 .825 
$21 .00 $42.000 $14.750 $29.500 
$24.00 $42.000 $17.125 $29,969 
$16.00 $10.400 $3,375 $2.194 
$19.00 $24.567 $12.750 $18.-
$12.50 $14.854 $7,000 $8.318 
$20.00 $80.000 $18.375 $73.500 
$13.00 $11.700 $8,000 $5.400 
$12.00 110.080 M.750 $3,990 
$21 .00 $21 .000 $15,000 $15.000 
S37.75 $56.625 $34.000 $51.000 
$18.00 $21 .600 $13.500 $16.200 
$6.25 $6.250 S0.875 $0.875 
$7.50 $5.250 $1 .000 S0.700 
$6 .00 $6,000 $1 ,500 $1 ,500 
$11 .75 $11 ,750 $7.750 $7,750 
$19.50 $44.070 $17.750 $40.115 
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Appendix B: Listing of IPOs Examiled (First Half d 1983) . 
(1) (2) 
Issuer Business 
MacNeal-Schwendler Dev engineering sof'twr 
Telecrafter CablolV 
First Financial Management Fln1 data processing svc 
Selecterm Lease/sell comp terminals 
Mobile CommunicaUons-America Te~communlcations svc 
Vega Blotechnologles Mfr biochem synthesis eqp 
Status Game Mfr v;deogame machines 
Telecl WHL phone inlerconnec:t sr-i 
CambOOge BioScience Oev/mfr/mkt blomed prods 
Endata Info processing svc 
Sentry Data Dev hospkal Info sys 
Magnetic lnfOfmation Technolgy Magnetic recording heads 
Electronic Financial Systems Own/operate A TMs 
Quality Micro Systems Mfr graphic processor 
BioTechnlca International Bicechnlcal research 
Medar Mfr welding controls 
Bio-Logic Systems Oev/mkt electrodiognstlc sys 
Ensun Mfr control sys 
lnterand Mr lelevkteo graphic sys 
Spectran Mfr flexible glass fiber 
Ouanll!lch Electronics Mfr eJedronic components 
Astro-Med Mfr computer graphic sys 
Sterling Software Oev/mkt sottwr prods 
BoMed Medical Manufacturing Mir medical Instruments 
Primages Mfr daisy wheel printer 
Giga-tronics Mfr microwave instruments 
Galileo Electro - Optics Mfr optical components 
Systems A.ssoclates Dev hospital comp sys 
Laser Photonics Mfr laser products 
Amherst Associates Hospital computer svc 
BFI Communlcattons Systems Mrr telephones/parts 
Scan-Tron Mr optical mark read equip 
Avant-Garde Computing Mkt data network softwr 
Applied Biosystems mfr biomed/biochem prods 
VLSI Te<:hnology Mir integrated circuits 
Compushop Retail personal computers 
Powertec Mfr electric power supplies 
Distributed Logic Mfr disk/tape controllers 
Artel Communications Mfr fiber optic transmit sys 
Integrated Software Systems Dev softwr/graphics 
Hytek Microsystems Mfr microcircuits 














































(4) (5) (6) m (8) (9) (10) 
Oeciine In 
Markel Market Cai: Mkt Capo, 
Shares Issue Cap.at Prloeat at3/30/M "'3/30/84 
/mil.I Price IPOISmil.l 3""~· ISmll.l "mil.) Sued? 
1.300 S23.00 $29.900 $20.250 $26.325 $3.575 No 
0 .637 S9.00 SS.733 S3.500 $2.230 S3.504 No 
0 .875 $17,00 $14.875 $13.250 $11 .stM $3.281 No 
0 .675 $18.00 $12. 150 S13.250 $8.944 $3.206 No 
1.500 S10.13 $15.188 $8.250 $12.375 S2.813 No 
1.225 $6.00 $7.350 S3.750 $4 .594 $2.756 No 
o.n5 S5.50 $4.263 $2.250 $1 .744 $2.519 No 
0.700 $5.00 S3.500 $1.750 11 .225 12.275 No 
1.000 S5.00 $5.000 $3.000 $3.000 12.000 No 
0.800 $13.00 $10.400 $10.750 sa.eoo 11 .eoo No 
0 .550 $7.50 $4.125 $4.750 $2J513 $1 .512 No 
0 .820 $6.25 SS.125 $4 .500 S3.890 $1.435 No 
o.eoo S7.00 $4 .200 $5.000 $3.000 11 .200 No 
0.950 $17.00 $16.150 $15.875 $15.0111 $1 .069 No 
o.eoo $8.75 $7.000 $7.500 $8.000 $1 .000 No 
0 .750 $5.00 $3.750 $3.750 12.813 $0.936 No 
0.000 $6.75 $4 .050 $5.250 S3.150 $0.900 No 
o.eoo $5.00 S3.000 $3.750 12.250 S0.750 No 
0.950 $10.00 $9.500 19.250 sa.1ee $0.713 No 
1.300 $7.00 $9,100 $8.750 sa.n5 $0,325 No 
0.825 SS.50 $4 .536 $5.125 $4 .228 S0.309 No 
0.350 $9.00 $3.150 $8.125 $2 .844 $0.306 No 
1,700 $9.00 $15.300 $8 .875 $15.068 $0,212 No 
o.eoo $5.00 $4 .000 SS.000 $4 .000 $0.000 No 
0.900 $7.00 $6.300 $7.500 $8 ,750 ($0.450 No 
0.850 $16.00 $13.000 116.750 $14.237 (S0.1137'. No 
0 .700 $10.00 $7.000 S11.500 $8.050 (11.050 No 
0.900 $18.00 $14 .400 $17.250 $15.525 ($1 .125 No 
o.eoo SS.00 $4 .000 $8.750 SS.400 ($1 .400 No 
o.no $15.00 $11 .550 117.000 $13.090 (11 .540 No 
0.900 $5.00 $4 .500 $8.750 $8.075 ($1 .575 No 
1.000 $12.50 $12.500 $14.250 $14.250 (11.750 No 
1.880 $16.00 S30.080 $17.000 $31.960 ($1 .880 YH 
1.295 $17.00 122.015 $18.500 $23.958 ($1 .94, No 
4.000 113.00 $52.000 113.500 $54.000 ($2.000 No 
1.250 $8.00 $10.000 110.000 $12.500 ($2 .500 No 
0.000 $10.75 $6.450 $15.250 $9.150 ($2.700 No 
o.eoo $7.00 $5.000 110.500 $8.400 ($2.800 No 
1.150 $6.00 $6.900 19.000 $10.350 ($3.450 No 
1.402 $16.00 $22.424 $18.500 125.928 ($3.504 No 
1.100 $7.00 $7.700 $10.500 $11.550 ($3.850 No 
0 .650 $8.00 $5.200 $14.000 $9.100 ($3.900 No 
Appendix B: Listlng of IPOs Examned (First Half of 1983) . 
(1) (2) (3) (4) IS) 
Issue Shares Issue 
Issuer Business Date Cmll.) Price 
Burr-8'own Mfr electronic components 24-Mar-83 1,200 $17.00 
MPSI Group OeY softwr 02-Mar-83 1.000 $12.00 
Xebec Mfr disk drtves 01-Mar-83 1.300 S17.00 
LyphoMed Mfr micronutrients 13-May-83 1,515 $12.00 
Digital Communications Mfr data communications sy 10-Feb-83 1.750 $17.50 
DatSySys~ms Engineering computer sys 01-Jun-63 2.000 $15.50 
Time Energy Systems OeY energy mngmnt sys 18-Feb-83 2.600 $15.00 
Information Resources Dev softwr consumer goods 04-Mar-83 1.150 $23.00 
Aoollo Comouter Mfr comouter svs 03-Mar-83 4 .000 $22.00 
Number of cases = 93 
-0 
N -
16) (7) (8) 
Market Market Cai 
Cap. at Price at at3/30/84 
IPOCSmll.l 3/30/84 "'-II.I 
$20.400 $20.500 $2 ... 600 
$12.000 $18.500 $16.500 
$22.100 $22.000 $28.600 
$18,160 $18.000 $27.270 
$30.625 $24 .000 $42.000 
$31 .000 $24 .250 $48,500 
$42.000 $21 .500 $60.200 
$28.450 $49.000 $56.350 






($4 ,200 No 


































Appendix C: Listing ol lPOs Examined (Second Hatt ol 1983) 
(1) (2) 
Issuer Business 
Applied Communications Oevsof'twr 
CTG Telephone system 
Applied Data Communications M~dlskdm,es 
zygo Laser measuring instrumnt 
Andowr C410trots Mfr buUding contr0, sys 
FreyAssociatn Develop software 
E-Z-EM Medical imaging supplles 
ComputerCraft Retail microcompU1ers 
z,.,1 Computer memory sys 
Advanced Telecommunications Long dist phone SVC 
ILC Technology Lght source/sensor prod 
Diagnon Clinical test kits 
CompuTrac Develop computer systems 
Key Imago Systems ComJ)<IW!r equlp/lollwr 
Cambrian Systems Comp.,_,, disk ... 1 equip 
CHAO Therapeutics Respiratory care devices 
Satellite SyndlcalOd Systems Satellite communications 
CMC International Computer systems 
Renal Systems Medlc:al devion/supplles 
Tefecommunlcations Specialists Dev satellite comm sys 
Terak M~rocomputer 
Paragon Communication System Mkt prNale phone sys 
Medslal SyslOrns Mkt on-line computer sys 
Physio Technotogy Biomed/orthopedic prods 
Woflco Data SyslOrns Oev/mkt softwr packages 
Lane Telecommunications Computer termlnaB 
Comptek Research Develop computer software 
Oat.acopy Computer graphk: sys 
IMRE Biomedical research 
lnfonnation Solutiore Mkt computer sys 
Continental Healthcare Systems Dev hospital computer 1y., 
Termlflex Computer terminals 
leeco Diagnostics Medical d'8gnostic kits 
International Medical System Dev lntrewnous pump 
SEEO Technology lntegraled circuits 
Stanford Te~munk:ations Telecornm equipment 
Cableguard Mkt cable 1V security sys 
lsomedlx Sterilize medical prods 
TLS Comp Info processing svc 
Radionics Computer alarm sys 
Pancretec Oesgn/mntr Infusion pumps 
Gull Comp~r equip/sys 
(3) (4) (5) (e) (7) (9) (9) (10) 
Oeciine in 
Market MarketC.., MktCapa, 
Issue Shall!S Issue Cap. at Price at al!~ "',:~ Dato lmll.l Price IPOISmll.l Q-M• Sued'/ 
07-Jul-83 1.275 $14 .50 $11!1 ,487 $10.750 $13.709 $4.791 No 
06-0ec-83 0.770 $9,00 $9.160 $2.1 25 $1.838 $4.524 No 
18-Nov-83 1.000 $1 1.00 S11.000 $9,500 $9,500 $4,500 No 
13-0ec-83 0.950 $14 .00 $13.300 $9.750 $9.283 $4,039 No 
15-Nov-83 1.000 $10.00 $10,000 $9,000 $9,000 $4,000 No 
27-Jul-83 0.375 $12.00 $4,500 $1.500 $0.563 $3.939 No 
20-0d-1!13 1.000 St-4 .00 $14.000 $10.250 $10.250 $3.750 No 
02-Aug-83 0.750 $9,50 $7,125 $4,750 $3,563 $3,563 No 
22-0ec-83 1.000 $10.00 $10.000 $9,500 $9,500 $3,500 No 
21-0ec-83 0.900 $9.00 $7.200 $4.250 $3.925 $3,375 No 
13-Jul-1!13 1.000 $13.00 $13.000 $9,525 $9 .525 $3,375 No 
13-Jul-83 1.000 $9.00 $9,000 $2.750 $2.750 $3,250 No 
19-Jul-83 0.500 $12.00 $9,000 $5,500 $2.750 $3,250 No 
03-Aug-1!13 0.755 $9.50 $4,973 $2.500 $1.913 $3.060 No 
10-Dec-1!13 o.eoo $5.00 $4,000 $1 ,250 $1 .000 $3,000 No 
20-Jul-63 0.750 $9.00 $4,500 $2.000 $1 .500 $3,000 No 
04-Aug-63 0.850 $12.00 $10.200 $9,500 $7.225 $2.D75 No 
08-Jul-63 0.673 $9.25 $4.200 $2,125 $1.430 S2.TT5 No 
20-Sep-1!13 0.500 $11 .00 $5,500 $5.500 $2.750 $2.750 No 
05-0ct-1!13 1.000 $5.00 $5.000 $2.375 $2.375 $2.525 No 
03-NOY-63 0.000 $5.00 $3 .000 $0.750 $0.450 $2.550 No 
29-Sep-1!13 0 .700 $5.00 $3,500 $1.500 $1.050 $2.450 No 
09-Nov-63 0.575 $7.00 $4,025 $2.750 $1 .591 $2.444 No 
10-NOY-83 0.536 $9.00 $4,288 $3,500 $1 .978 $2.412 No 
22-Nov-83 0.900 $5.00 $4,000 $2.000 $1.900 $2.400 No 
02-NOY-83 1.050 $7.50 $7.875 $5.250 $5,513 $2.353 No 
14-Jul-1!13 0.710 $13.00 $9.230 $9.750 $9,922 $2.309 No 
09-0d-1!13 1.900 $9,00 S9.eoo $4.525 $7,400 $2.200 No 
14-Dec-83 o .eoo $5.00 $3,000 $1.500 $0.900 $2.100 No 
07-0ct-1!13 0 .000 $5.00 $3,000 $1.500 $0,900 $2,100 No 
27-Sep-1!13 1.100 $5.75 $5.325 $3.875 $4.2113 $2 .093 No 
15-Sep-1!13 0 .400 $9.00 $3.200 $3,000 $1 .200 $2.000 No 
13-0d-1!13 0 .000 $9.00 $3,000 $2.750 $1.550 $1 .950 No 
12-Jul-83 0.700 $5.00 $3.500 $2.375 $UMS2 $1 .638 No 
12-0d-1!13 1.eoo $10.00 $19.000 $9,000 $15.200 s1 .eoo No 
09-0d-1!13 0.900 $13.00 $11 .700 $11 ,250 $10.125 $1 .575 No 
18-Aug-83 0,700 $5.00 $3.500 $2.750 $1 .925 $1 ,575 No 
14-Jul-1!13 1.250 $13.00 $15.250 $11 .750 $14.5811 $1 .563 No 
04-Nov-83 0.000 $5 ,00 $4 .900 $5,750 $3.450 $1 .350 No 
07-0ct-1!13 1.050 $11 .00 $11 .550 $9,750 $10.238 $1 ,313 No 
17-Nov-83 0.650 $9.00 $3,900 $4,250 S2.7153 $1 .1311 No 





Appendix C: Listing at IPOs Examined (Second Half of 1963) . 
(1) (2) 
Issuer BLBiness 
Cermetek Microelectronics Computer modem/equip 
System Integrators Compu1er editing sys 
Endotronic:s Biotech research equip 
StarTel Computer te)ecomm sys 
Cardk>Search Biomedical devices 
Parle• Semlcond components 
Sterr.et Laboratories Dev equine pharmac:eutcals 
Ok:eon Electronics Comp~r circuit board 
lntelliCorp Dev computer software 
Interactive Radiation Crystal laser prod 
Western Micro Technology WHL senlicond cmpnents 
Medlflex Systems Softwr/OP SVCS-hospitals 
lnnovatNe Software Dev computer software 
Lasers for Medicine Medical laser system 
Cincimati Microwave Radar warning receiver 
KMWSystems Compul!tr process equip 
Synbiotics Biomed products 
Clprico Disk controllers/adapter 
Entre Computer Centers Franchise computer stores 
Compucare Hospital Info processing svc 
Datakey Portable Info sys 
Thermedics Biomed products 
Vodavl Technology Electronlc phone sys 
Total Systems Sel"\'lc:es Bank card data sys 
Aek:1-Ashman Semlcondud:or test equip 
Personal Computer Products Circul cards 
BKWSy,lems Dev computerized bank sys 
Comp-U-Card ln'9rnational Consumer Info database 
Fibronics International Data communications equip 
Valid Logic Systems Comp engineering sys 
International Technology Envi'onmental mgmnt svc 
Component Technology Thermoplastic prods 
Fitw!rtek Companies Mnfr fittration elements 
Richardson Electronics Electr tube/semicond 
Telxon Portable microcomputers 
Chargit Telephone ticket svc 
VMX Vofce message exch sys 
International Hydron Contact lenses 
Electro Scientific Industries Laser Instruments 
Bel Fuse Electronic components 
Lotus Development Dev software 














































(4) (SJ (6) (7) (8) 
Market ~:::i<;:' Shares Issue Cap. at Price at 
lmll.l Price IPO(Smll.) 9/28/8', ISmll .l 
0.845 $800 $8,760 $7 ,125 $8 ,021 
1.350 $10,00 $13,500 $9,500 $12,825 
0 ,640 $7,00 $4,480 $8,000 $3,8',0 
0,900 $5,00 $4,500 $4,375 $3,938 
0.550 $6,50 $3,575 $5.500 $3 ,025 
0.500 $14.50 $7,250 $13,500 $6.750 
0,600 $5,75 $3,450 $5,000 $3,000 
1.800 $16.00 $28,800 $15,750 $28,350 
1.600 $6,00 $9.600 $5,750 $9,200 
0,500 $8,00 $4,000 $7,250 $3,825 
0 ,850 $10,00 $8,500 $9,750 $8,288 
0.850 $15,00 $12,750 $14,750 $12,538 
0 ,530 $8,50 $4,505 $8,250 $4,373 
0 ,500 $6,25 $3,125 $6,000 $3,000 
1,800 $12.00 $21.600 $12.000 $21 ,800 
0.450 $10,00 $4.500 $10,500 $4,725 
0.400 $10.00 $4.000 $10.750 $4.300 
0 ,627 $12,00 $7,524 $12,500 $7,838 
1.400 $12.00 $16.800 $12,250 $17.150 
1,000 $12,50 $12.500 $13,000 $13.000 
0.750 $5,00 $3.750 $8.250 $4.688 
0,650 $9.50 $6.175 $11,000 $7.150 
1.400 $8.00 $11.200 $8.750 $12,250 
0 ,500 $15,00 $7.500 $17.250 $8.025 
0.600 $5,00 $3,000 $7,000 $4.200 
0.640 $5,00 $3.200 $7.000 $4,480 
1.000 $5,00 $5.000 $8,625 $8.025 
1.250 $20.50 $25.825 $22,000 $27,500 
0,650 $9,00 $5.850 $12,000 $7.800 
2.660 $12.50 $33.250 $13.375 $35.578 
1.450 SIS.SO $22.475 $17.250 $25,013 
0.450 $7.00 $3.150 $13,250 $5,983 
1.000 $12.00 $12.000 $15.488 $15.488 
0.700 $16.00 $11 .200 $22,500 $15.750 
1.600 $13.00 $20.800 $18,000 $25,800 
1.350 $5.00 $6.750 $6.625 $11.1544 
2,500 $9.00 $22.500 $11 ,000 $27.500 
1.000 $11 .00 $11,000 $18,875 $18,875 
1.200 $15,00 $18.000 $20,000 $24.000 
0.510 $13,00 $6,630 $29.000 $14.700 
2.600 $18.00 $46,800 $22,000 $57.200 


























































































































Appendix C : Listing of IPOs Exal'liled (Second Hall of 1983) . 
(1) (2) 
Issuer Business 
Trilogy Computer systems 
COMPAQ Computer Personal computers 
Zymos Integrated circuit!. 
Kaypro Portable computer sys 
MlcroD Distr computer softwr/eqp 
Applied Circuit Techn°'ogy Disk dri¥1!1 test equip 
Circon Medical video cameras 
CooperBiomedlcal Medical lab prods 
Information Science Mkt softwr/DP SVC 
MlniScribe Computer disk dl'l\lM 
Integrated Genetics Dev medcVdlagnOBUc prod 
Kol!! Medical Artificial human organs 
Archive Mfr computer tape drives 
lmatron Dev diagnostic scanner 
Marquest Medical Products Disposable medical prod 
Satelco Voice & data tek!!comm svc 
Protocol Computers Computer equip 
Formaster, Compuler systems 
Chiron Biopharmac:euticals prods 
lmmunex Immunological prods 
Ashton-Tate Dev computer softwr 
Stratus Computer CompUW!rs 
GTECH Computer-based ntwrks 
Datasouth Computer Computer printers 
Ufltline Systems Emergency response sys 
Advanced Genetic Sciences Agrlculural biotechnology 
FOP Develop software sys 
Iomega Cartridge disk drMOS 
Cell Products Fermentation prods 
Bio-Technology General R&Dlabs 
PerfectOata Comp maintl!tnance prods 
Ault Power conversion prods 
Baron Data Systems Computler transcripUon sys 
Esprit Systems Develop video terminal 
Buslnessland Retail computer stores 
California Amplifier Mtr/mkt microwave amps 
ATV Systems Mfr computer sys 
California Biotechnology Biotechnologica l research 
ComGen Technology Ek!ctronlc products 
Superl!X Semkx>nductors 
lnstrumentarium Medlcal/consumer prods 
P.C . Te\emart Dev sottwr dl'Str sys 
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Deciine ln 
Market Markel Cai MktCapa, 
Issue Shares Issue Cap. at Price at at 9/25/IJJI of 9/28/IJJI 
Date lmll.l Price IPOISmll.) 9/28/IJJI ($mil.) (Smll.) Sued? 
09-NoY-83 5 .000 s12.oo $60.000 $1 .313 $8.565 SS3.435 Yes 
09-Dec-83 6 .000 $11.00 $66.000 S4.625 $27.750 $36.250 No 
21-Jul-63 3 .750 $12 .50 S46.875 $2,375 $8 .110(1 $37.969 No 
25-Aug-83 4.000 $10,00 S40.000 $2.875 $11 .500 S28.500 Yes 
12-Jul-83 2.000 $16,00 $32.000 S4.625 S9.250 S22.750 No 
O<C-Aug-83 2 .150 $11 .00 $23.650 S0.875 $1 .681 $21 .769 No 
07-Jul-83 1.250 $22.00 $27.500 $5.250 $8.563 S20.938 No 
04-Aug-83 2.750 $11.00 $30.250 S4.375 $12.031 $18.219 No 
03-Aug-83 1.482 S17.oo S25.1!14 S5.250 S7.78t $17,414 No 
03-Nov-83 2.000 $11 .50 S23.000 $3.125 $8.250 $18.750 No 
19-Jul-83 1.600 S13.00 $20.800 $4.125 $8.800 $14.200 No 
15-Jul-83 1.500 $12.50 $18.750 S3.825 SS.438 $13.313 No 
16-0ec-83 2.500 S10.00 $25.000 $5.000 $12.500 $12.500 No 
03-Aug-83 6.000 $5.00 $30.000 $3.000 $18.000 $12.000 No 
01-Jul-83 1.300 $17.00 $22.100 $8.000 $10.400 $11 .700 No 
12-Jul-83 1.100 $12.00 $13.200 $1 .825 S1 .768 $11 .413 Yes 
29-Sep-83 1.200 $12.00 $14.«>0 S3.SOO S4.200 $10.200 No 
tS-Dec-83 1.250 $10.00 $12.500 $1 .875 $2.344 $10.158 No 
02-Aug-83 1.500 $12.00 S18.000 SS.500 $8.250 $9.750 No 
01-Jul-83 1.500 S11 .00 $18.500 S4.750 S7.125 $9.375 No 
30- Nov-83 1.700 $14.00 $23.800 $8.500 $14.450 $9.350 No 
26-Aug-83 3.000 $12.00 $36.000 $9.000 $27.000 $9.000 No 
20-Jul-83 2.050 $13.25 $27.182 $8.875 $18.194 $8.969 No 
25-Aug-83 1.100 s12.oo $13.200 S4.250 S4.875 $8.525 No 
27-Jul-83 1.000 $13.00 $13.000 S4.750 S4.750 $8.250 No 
22-Sep-83 0 .750 S15.00 $11 .250 S4.000 $3.000 $8.250 No 
12-Aug-83 1.300 $13.00 S16.900 $7.000 $9.100 S7.800 No 
07-Jul-83 2.200 $10.00 $22.000 $8.875 $15.125 $8.875 No 
01-Sep-83 1.000 $8.00 $8.000 S1 .750 S1 .750 $8.250 No 
29-Sep-83 0 .800 $13.00 $10.400 $5.313 S4.250 se.150 No 
12-Jul-83 1.085 $8.50 $9.223 $3.000 $3.255 $5.968 No 
25-Aug-83 0.850 $10.50 $8.925 $3.500 $2.975 $5.950 No 
13-Jul-83 1.000 $15.00 $15.000 $9.250 $9.250 $5.750 No 
07-0ct-83 1.100 $8.00 $8.800 S2.875 S3.183 $5,638 No 
14-Dec-83 5 .000 $10.00 $50.000 $8.875 S44.375 $5.625 No 
13-Dec-83 1.000 $10.00 $10.000 S4.750 S4.750 $5.250 No 
18-0ct-83 0 .600 S10.00 se.ooo S1.250 $0.750 $5.250 Yes 
26-0ct-83 1.000 S12.00 s12.ooo $8.750 $8.750 $5.250 No 
11-Aug-83 1.300 $5.00 S6.500 $1 .000 $1 .300 $5.200 No 
06-0ec-83 1.500 $9.00 $13.500 $5.625 $8.438 $5.063 No 
18-Aug-83 1.300 $13.00 $16.900 S9.250 $12.025 S4.875 No 





Appendix C: Listing of IPOs Examined (Second Half 011983) . 
(1) (2) 
lnuer Business 
STAAA Surgical Company lntraocular tenses 
American Educational Computer Dev educational sottwr 
First Data Resources On-llne database 
CnnuTele Graohlc disolav svs 







06 Oci - 63 
(4) (5) (6) 
Market 
Shares Issue Cap. at 
(mil.I Price IPO(Smll.l 
0 .640 $6.25 $4 .000 
0 .600 $5.00 $3.000 
4.000 $14.00 $56.000 
0 .600 $10.00 $6,000 
(7) (6) (9) 
Decline In 
Market Cej MktCapa, 
Prioeat at9/2e/64 o/9/26/84 
9/26/84 ISmll.l ISmll.l 
$23.675 $15.260 ($11 .260 
$24.000 St ◄ .◄00 ($11 .◄00 
$17.375 $69.500 ($13 .500 
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